Kayahan Index ve haberler BUYUK COKUS

[B][COLOR=#0000FF]altug@rj.com.tr


Hepinizin birkaç gündür takip ettiği üzere Amerikan Hazinesi ve Amerikan Merkez Bankası, bankalardaki kötü aktifleri temizlemek adına 700 milyar dolar büyüklüğünde bir plan açıkladı ve finans piyasalarında adeta bayram havası oluştu. Şimdilerde baktığımızda ise piyasaların ayağının biraz daha yere bastığını gözlemliyoruz. Bu durulmada etkili olan baş faktörün paketin büyüklüğünün ve kapsamının kongrede kabul edilecek haliyle sorunları çözmeye yeterli olmayabileceği kaygısı. Ama biz olaya biraz daha farklı bir açıdan bakalım ve gelecek dönemde Amerika'da ve dünyada neler olacak onları irdelemeye çalışalım. Bunu yaparken müsadenizle bu sefer hayal gücünüzü de biraz zorlayacağım. Belki de "bu kadar da olmaz" diyebilirsiniz; ama malum en kötüsüne hazırlıklı olmak zorundayız. İşte Amerika'da ve dünyada bundan sonra neler olabileceği konusu:

1- Amerika ve dolayısıyla dünya büyümesi yavaşlayacak: Amerika'da finans sektörünün toplam gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla (GSYH) içindeki payı son açıklanan rakamlara göre yüzde 8 civarında. Bu da demek oluyor ki; toplam 14 trilyon dolarlık bir ekonomi olan Amerikan ekonomisinde finans sektörünün bir yıl içinde yarattığı katma değer yaklaşık 1.1 trilyon dolar. Bu finans sektörünün doğrudan GSYH içindeki payı. Finans sektörünün ayrıca GSYH'nin yüzde 70'den fazlasını oluşturan tüketicileri finanse ettiği unutulmamalı. Yani finans sektörünün dolaylı etkisi de mevcut toplam büyüme üzerinde. Amerika'da şimdilik 16 tane ticari, bölgesel ve yatırım bankasını batıran bu krizin yüksek riskli konut kredileriyle başlayıp bu alanla ilintili veya ilintisiz bütün türev enstrümanlarıyla ilgili problem yarattığı düşünüldüğünde (ki türev enstrümanları derken Amerikan GSYH'nin yaklaşık 40 katına ulaşmış bir büyüklükten söz ediyoruz) açıklanan paketin sektörü tam olarak temizlemeye yetmeyeceği ortada. Dolayısıyla mevcut durumda finans sektörünün kaldıraç kullanarak meydana getirdiği parasal genişleme ciddi bir daralma trendine girecek. Diğer bir ifadeyle Amerika'dan başlamak üzere finans sektöründe büyük çaplı ufalmalarla karşı karşıya kalacağız. Tüketicinin zaten tüketmekten kaçındığı, işsizliğin arttığı ve bir de finans sektörünün küçüldüğü bir ortamda Amerikan ekonomisinin ve ona bağlı olarak Avrupa ve Japonya ekonomilerinin yavaşlaması gerekiyor. Resesyon olur mu onu bilemem ama sıfıra çok yakın büyüme oranları (büyüyememe) uzun bir süre bizlerle birlikte olabilir.

2- Büyümedeki yavaşlamaya karşın faizler yüksek kalacak: Belli ki Amerikan ekonomisi 4 Kasım'da yapılacak başkanlık seçimlerinin sonrasında da finans piyasalarındaki ve şimdilerde reel sektöre de sıçrayan bu krizle uğraşmak zorunda kalacak. 700 milyar dolarlık paketle birlikte 1 trilyon doları aşacak kurtarma planlarının belki 2 belki de 3 trilyon dolara yükselmesi gerekecek. Bu harcamaları vergi mükelleflerinin üstleneceği açık ama bu harcanan ve harcanacak olan paraların bir bedeli olacak. Amerika iki tercih arasında kalacak. Ya para basarak bu açığı kapatmaya çalışacak ya da piyasaya daha fazla devlet tahvili sürecek. Son rakamlara göre Amerika'da toplam kamu borcu 9.7 trilyon dolar seviyesinde, yapılan harcamalarla kamu borç stoku 11 trilyon doların üstüne çıkacak. Borç dinamiklerindeki bu bozulma nedeniyle iki sonuç ortaya çıkacak. Kredi derecelendirme kuruluşları Amerika'nın kredi notunu düşürecek veya yatırımcılar zaten Amerika'yı daha riskli görüp Amerika'ya borç vermek için talep ettikleri risk primini (faiz) yükseltecek. Basit bir anlatımla rezervlerinin büyük bir kısmını Amerikan tahvillerine yatıran Çin ve Japonya Amerika'dan daha fazla faiz talep edecek. Yok eğer Amerika para basar ve bu açığı öyle kapatırsa o zaman da enflasyon artacak ve doğal olarak faizler yine yüksek kalacak.

3- Enflasyon yüksek seyretmeye devam edecek: Her ne kadar tüketici tarafından herhangi bir enflasyonist baskı gelmeyecek gibi gözükse de bütçe açığı GSYH'nin yüzde 5'ini aşmak üzere olan Amerika'da enflasyon yüksek kalmaya devam edebilir. Büyümenin yavaşladığı ve faizlerin yüksek kaldığı bir ortamda bono dışında yatırımcıların güvenli liman arayışı altın ve petrol gibi emtialar olabilir ve böyle bir ortamda hızlı bir petrol ve türevi ürünlerdeki yükseliş sadece Amerika'da değil dünyada enflasyonist baskıların kolay kolay azalmayacağı anlamına gelir.

Esasında gelecekte olacaklar için şimdiden yorum yapmak çok kolay değil, ama bu en kötü senaryo gerçekleşirse aklımızda olması gereken birkaç noktayı da belirtmem gerekiyor: 1- Yüksek kalan faiz, düşük büyüme ve nispeten yüksek enflasyon gelişmekte olan piyasalar açısından belki de dünya tarihinin en kötü dönemini bize yaşatabilir. 2- Özellikle cari açığını bizim gibi borçla kapatma eğilimi gösteren ülkeler bu ortamda en çok hasarı alabilir. [/COLOR][/B]

KARANLIĞA GİDEN YOLDA ARJANTİN: NASIL BU HALE GELDİ? IMF NE KADAR SUÇLU? [RIGHT]14.6.2003[/RIGHT]

Latin Amerika ülkelerinden neo-liberalizmin önde gelen temsilcilerinden olan Arjantin’in ne gibi gelişmeler sonucu sosyal çalkantıların, geniş halk kitlelerinin protestolarının ve ekonomik zorlukların önlenemediği bir ülke haline geldiğinin incelendiği bu yazıda öncelikle Arjantin ekonomisinin geride bıraktığımız yüzyıldaki konumu son yıllara ağırlık verilerek açıklanacaktır. Ayrıca Arjantin ekonomisinin belirleyici unsurlarından biri olan Konvertibilite Planı ve IMF’ nin bu krize giden yoldaki rolü detaylarıyla incelenerek Arjantin ekonomisinin çöküşe giden süreci değerlendirilecektir. Bu yazıda ayrıca Arjantin krizinden çıkarılacak sonuçlardan ve krizlerin toplumların sosyal yapılarını nasıl etkilediğinden de bahsedilecektir.

[B]Çöküşe Giden Yolda Arjantin Ekonomisine Kısa Bir Bakış[/B]
Arjantin 1930’lu yıllarda tarım ürünleri ihracatına dayanan bir ekonomiye sahipti ve gelişmiş ülkelerden birisi olarak kabul ediliyordu. Fakat 2.Dünya Savaşı sonrası kalkınma süreci bir hayal kırıklığı yarattı. Uygulanan yanlış ekonomik politikalar ve toplum içindeki sanayiye dayanan bir yapı taraftarları ve tarıma dayalı bir yapı taraftarları arasındaki fikir ayrılıkları nedeniyle ekonomik büyüme düşük düzeyde kalmış ; bu ayrılıklar ciddi boyutta enflasyon ve sürekli krizlere neden olmuştur. Oluşan bu istikrarsız ortam nedeniyle sanayileşme geri kalmıştır.

1966-1983 döneminde askeri hükümet süreci yaşayan Arjantin 1983 yılında demokratik döneme başlangıç yapmıştır. 1980’ler boyunca Arjantin ekonomisinin temel sorunu kamu sektöründeki olağandışı açık ile bu açığın özel sektör tasarruflarınca kapatılamaması olguları olmuştur. Arjantin 1990’a yılda yüzde 1350’ye varan bir hiper-enflasyon, ulusal para biriminin çöktüğü bir mali yapı ve derin bir krize sürüklenen sanayi sektörü ile birlikte girmek zorunda kalmıştır. 1990’ın ilk aylarında ilan edilen ve temel olarak kamu iç borç senetlerinin zorunlu olarak uzun vadeye yayılmasını hedefleyen Bonex Planı da yetersiz kalmış, böylece ulusal ekonomide para biriminin anlamını yitirdiği bir de-monetizasyon süreci yaşanmıştır.

Dolayısıyla 1990’dan itibaren daha kapsamlı bir reform paketinin uygulanma gerekliliği ortaya çıkmıştır.bu sebeplerle ortaya konan Konvertibilite Planı pesoyu dolara eşitlemiş,güven ortamını yeniden sağlamış ve hiper-enflasyonla mücadelede önemli adımlar atmıştır.Programın ilk iki yılında hiper-enflasyon kontrol altına alınmış,sonraki yıllarda tek haneli rakamlara inmiş,hatta 1999’da eksi değerlere ulaşmıştır. Enflasyondaki düşüşe paralel olarak uygulanan özelleştirme programı ile geniş çaplı bir özelleştirmeye gidilmiştir. Buradan gelen gelirler ile hem dolar-peso eşitliği korunmuş, hem de kamu açıkları ve dış ödemeler dengesinden kaynaklanan açıklar finanse edilmiştir. Ekonomik istikrar ve özelleştirmedeki başarı yabancı sermaye girişlerini hızlandırmış, bu da ekonomik büyüme sürecini olumlu etkilemiştir. Ancak sadece dış kaynaklara bağlı olan bu tarz bir ekonomik büyüme,istikrarsız ve kırılgan bir yapı sergilemiştir. Bu nedenle 1990ların ortasına kadar başarılı bir grafik çizen Arjantin’in yaşadığı kriz ortamını incelemek için Konvertibilite Planı’na ve ekonomik göstergelere derinlemesine bakmak gerekir.

[B] Konvertibite Planı ve Sonrasında Arjantin[/B]
1990’ların sonunda ortaya çıkan reform isteği belli amaçlar gütmekteydi:

[LIST=1][*]kamu dengelerinde sürdürülebilir bir dengenin sağlanması[*]de-monetizasyon sürecinin geri çevrilmesi ve likidite talebinin canlandırılması[*]dış kredi kuruluşları ile olan mali ilişkilerin yeniden düzenlenmesi[/LIST]
1991’in Mart/Nisan aylarında uygulamaya konulan Konvertibilite Planı, bu hedeflere ulaşmak için hazırlanmış olan geniş kapsamlı bir projeydi. Konvertibilite Planı’nın ana unsurları bir yandan para politikasının kurallarının yeni bir yasal düzenlemeyle değiştirilmesi ve finansal sistemin kuralsızlaştırılması (de-regülasyon) gibi mali tedbirlerle; diğer yandan da ödemeler dengesinin sermaye kalemlerinin tamamen serbestleştirilmesi ve reel üretim sektörlerinde kapsamlı bir özelleştirme gibi yapısal dönüşümleri içeriyordu. Bu programın en önemli ayağını finansal kesime yönelik düzenlemeler oluşturmaktaydı. Buna göre Arjantin ulusal para birimi, Peso, bire-bir biçimde Amerikan dolarına sabit kılınıyor, Merkez Bankası’nın para basma olanakları da sadece döviz rezervleriyle sınırlı tutuluyordu. Plan’ın “konvertibilite” özelliğini vurgulayan bu adım, Arjantin Merkez Bankası’nın tüm parasal politika araçlarını kısıtlıyor ve bu kurumu bir tür Döviz İdaresi - Muhasebe Kuruluşu’na dönüştürüyordu. Kamu kesimine yönelik yeni politikaların temel amacı, gerek Merkez Bankası’nın, gerekse hükümetin yurt-içi kredi piyasalarından uzaklaştırılmasına yönelikti. Öte yandan, üretici sektörlere yapılan yatırımlarda yurt-dışı ve yurt-içi sermaye arasındaki tüm ayırımlar, yurt-dışı sermayenin kar transferlerine yönelik tüm vergiler ile birlikte kaldırılıyordu. Ayrıca bankacılık sektörünün mevduatları üzerindeki her türlü kamu sigortası ve/veya mevduat garantisi yasaklanarak, bankaların kendi özel sigortalarını temin etme zorunluluğu getirilmekteydi. Konvertibilite planının son halkasını kapsamlı bir özelleştirme süreci oluşturmaktaydı. Böylece 1991-1994 arasında kamuya toplam 12 milyar dolara yakın bir gelir sağlanıyordu.

Konvertibilite Planı hiper-enflasyonist baskıları iki sene içinde kontrol altına almayı başarmış ve tüketici fiyatları artış hızı 1991’de yüzde 84’e, 1993’te de yüzde 7.4’e çekilmiştir.. 1995 yılının enflasyon oranı yüzde 2’nin altına inmiştir.. Makro ekonomik istikrarın kurulması ve ulusal mali piyasalarda güvenin sağlanmasına koşut olarak, yabancı yatırımcıların spekülatif portföy yatırımları hızla artmış, programın daha ilk iki yılında Arjantin ekonomisine toplam 15 milyar dolar yabancı sermaye girişi gerçekleşmiştir. Gayrı safi yurt-içi hasıla (GSYİH) 5 senelik dönem içinde dolar bazında 2 misli büyümüştür. Ancak söz konusu gelişmenin aşırı değerli döviz kurundan kaynaklandığı için yapay olduğunu belirtmek gerekir.

Her ne kadar olumlu göstergeler getirse de, Konvertibilite Planı para politikasındaki esnekliği kaldırmıştır. Para arzının artırılamaması da 1990ların sonuna doğru ortaya çıkan durgunluğu önleyememiş,yavaşlayan büyüme ve zayıflayan dış sermaye akışı sabit kur nedeniyle deflasyonist baskılara sebep olmuştur. Buna ek olarak, Arjantin ekonomisinin 1990-sonrası büyüme potansiyelinin doğrudan doğruya yabancı sermaye girişlerine ve bu yolla elde edilen yurt-dışı tasarruflara bağımlı olması; ve son derece hassas dengeler üzerinde sürdürülen dış kaynağın 1995’te kurumasıyla da ulusal üretim kapasitesi derin bir daralmaya sürüklenmiştir. Söz konusu daralma, 1997 Doğu Asya, 1998 Rusya krizlerinin bulaşma etkisiyle giderek derinleşmiş ve 1999 yılında Brezilya’nın devalüasyon kararıyla birlikte Arjantin ihracat pazarlarını da yitirmiştir.

Ayrıca,doksanlı yılların ilk yarısındaki 14.2 milyar dolarlık hızlı ve büyük oranlı özelleştirme,bu on yıllık dönemin 2. yarısında doyuma ulaşmıştır. Böylelikle kamu kesimi dengesinin sağlanması zorlaşmıştır. Ayrıca 1990 ve 1994 arasında, Arjantin’in ihracat gelirleri 12-16 milyar dolar civarında seyrederken; ithalat harcamaları yüzde 500 büyüyerek, 4 milyar dolardan 21 milyar dolara yükselmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak, 1990’da 5 milyar dolar fazla veren cari işlemler dengesi, 1992’de 6.7 milyar dolar, 1994’te de 10.2 milyar dolar açık vermiştir. Arjantin hükümeti ise dolar üzerinden çıkardığı devlet tahvilleri ile sermaye girişini sağlamaya çalışarak oluşan bu açıkları önlemeye çalışmış,bu çaba IMF yönetimince de desteklenerek ek kredi verilmiştir. Fakat Brezilya krizi sonrası özel sermaye girişi daha da zayıflamış ve ekonomik dengesizlik gitgide artmıştır.

[B] Arjantin Ekonomisinde Çöküş[/B]
1990larda krize giren diğer ülkelerde olduğu gibi Arjantin de benzer özellikler taşımaktaydı:

[LIST=1][*]yoğun sıcak para girişleri;[*]ulusal paradan uzaklaşma (dolarizasyon);[*]reel olarak aşırı değerlenmiş döviz kurundan kaynaklanan ticaret açıkları ve bunun pompaladığı yapay büyüme ve aşırı tüketim patlaması;[*]finans piyasalarında tekelci yoğunlaşma ve bunun getirdiği kaynak israfı ve adaletsiz gelir dağılımı süreci[/LIST]
Elde edilen hızlı büyüme ve enflasyondaki düşüşe rağmen ithalat kaynaklı tüketim artmış ve dış ticaret dengeleri tehlike sinyalleri vermeye başlamıştı. Meksika’da 1994 Aralık’ında yaşanan devalüasyon sonrasında ortaya çıkan ve tüm Latin Amerika ülkelerini etkileyen mali krizden Arjantin de payını alıyordu. Amerika’da faiz hadlerinin yükselmesine koşut olarak, kısa vadeli (sıcak) sermaye istikrarsızlaşmaya başlayan Latin Amerika piyasalarını hızla terkediyor ve dünya ölçeğinde daha güvenli ve yüksek getirili pazarlar arıyordu. Gerek ekonomik büyümesini, gerekse de parasal tabanını dış sermaye akımlarına bağlamış olan Arjantin ekonomisi için bu olgu, ülke tarihindeki en derin iktisadi bunalımın ön koşullarını ortaya çıkartıyordu.1997 Asya krizi ve daha sonra komşusu Brezilya’nın krizlerinden olumsuz etkilenen Arjantin ‘de IMF yoğunlaşan krizin idaresini bizzat üstleniyor ve 1998’de 3 milyar dolar, daha sonra da 13.7 milyar dolar ve 2002’de 26 milyar dolarlık kredi paketlerini hazırlıyordu.

IMF’nin çabalarına rağmen dış ticaretteki dengesizlik Brezilya krizi ile daha da artarak ekonomiyi zorlamaya başladı ve düşük ihracat gelirleri ülkenin dolar üzerinden olan borçlarını çevirmesini zorlaştırdı. Ayrıca doların değerindeki artış pesonun da uluslararası piyasalarda değerlenmesine yol açtı. Bu durum sanayi ihracatının da düşmesiyle yurt içi üretimi tehdit etmeye başladı. İthal ucuz Asya malları iç piyasaya hakim olmaya başladı ve düşen sanayi faaliyetleri işsizlik oranında artışa ve küçük ve orta boylu işletmelerin birbiri ardına iflas etmelerine yol açtı. Milli gelirdeki artışın ciddi boyutlarda azalmasına paralel olarak kamu gelirleri azalmaya ve kamu finansman dengesi daha da bozulmaya başladı. IMF de sağladığı paketlere bağlı olarak kamu harcamalarında bir azalmaya gidilmesini istedi. Buna bağlı olarak kamu maaşlarında yüzde 20’lik bir daralma ve tüm sosyal programların askıya alınması gerçekleştirildi.

ARJANTİN’İN BAŞLICA EKONOMİK GÖSTERGELERİ
1998199920002001 İhracat (milyon$)26.44023.33026.40924.711 İthalat (milyon$)31.40025.51025.24319.380 Dış Borçlar (Milyar $)142147154132 TÜFE (%)0,9-1,8-0,7-1,5 GSYİH(Milyar $)298,9283,3284,9
GSYİH Büyüme Hızı (%)2-5,20,5
Fert Başına Milli Hasıla ($)8.2777.7447.695
Nüfus (Milyon) 36,136,637
Döviz Kuru1111 İşsizlik Oranı (%)12,413,814,718,1 Yabancı Sermaye Girişleri (Milyon $)13.96928.58812.328 6.157

IMF’ nin bu noktada politikası Arjantin’de maaşların, emeklilik ödemelerinin ve sosyal harcamalara ilişkin kamusal yükümlülüklerin yerine getirilmesi yerine, yabancı bankaların alacaklarının tahsilini güvence altına alacak bir siyasi tercihi zorla empoze ettirmeye dayalıydı. Fakat bu politikanın uygulanması istenirken Arjantin’in içinde bulunduğu sosyal durum problemli idi. Özelleştirme ile elektrik,telefon gibi temel hizmetler hızla pahalılaşmış ve gelir adaletsizliği derinleşmişti.1999 ‘dan sonra ekonomik bunalımın artması sonucu programa verilen destek azaldı. Arjantin ‘in borç sorunları ciddileşti. Vergi gelirlerinde önemli düşüşler ve dolar üzerinden çıkarılan tahvillere bağlı olarak ağırlaşan borç yükü borcun çevrilmesini giderek zorlaştırdı ve “Borç Tuzağı” ile sonuçlandı. 2001 yılı Mart ayında yeniden Ekonomi Bakanlığı görevine getirilen Cavallo, finansal piyasalardaki güçlü kredibilitesi ile ilk başta Arjantin’in tam aradığı kişi gibi görünmesine rağmen, ekonomik büyümeyi vergi ve ticaret politikalarının geleneksel olmayan bir karışımı ile gerçekleştirme çabaları ve para kurulu rejimini, Euroya, dolarınkiyle paralel bir rol vererek değiştirme girişimleri piyasalar tarafından negatif algılandı ve kendisine pahalıya mal oldu. Arjantin’in borçlarını ödeyemeyebileceği korkusuyla piyasalar çok yüksek faiz talep eder hale gelirken, faizlerin geldiği seviyeler borç ödemelerinin durmasına neden oldu. Borçların ve döviz kuru politikalarının sürdürülebilirliği hakkında oluşan şüpheler, 2001 yılının ilk yarısında mevduat sahiplerinin bankacılık sisteminden ve ülkeden kaçmalarına neden oldu. Uluslararası rezervler yılın ilk yedi ayında yaklaşık %40 düştü ve sadece Temmuz ayındaki azalış %25’e ulaştı.Yurt içi kredi piyasasından borçlanma imkanı kalmadı. Fon transferini önlemek için hükümet vadesi gelen bonolarını ve kısa dönem borçlarını yüksek faiz oranlı yeni uzun dönem enstrümanlarla takas etmeye başladı. Bu başarısız girişimlerden sonuç alınamaması üzerine, kamu harcamalarını gelirler ile sınırlandıran “sıfır açık planı” başlatıldı ve maaşlar ile emeklilik fonlarında %13’e varan oranlarda kesintiler yapılarak bu plan uygulandı. Fakat bu karar sosyal protestolar ve direnişle karşılaştı. Bu da krizin daha da derinleşmesine yol açtı. Yoğun protestolar ve halk ayaklanmaları neticesinde önce Cavallo ardından da devlet başkanı de la Rua istifa etmek zorunda kaldı. Krizin derinleşmesi, pesonun devalüe edileceği söylentilerini iyice güçlendirince hükümet insanların pesolarını dolara çevirmelerini önlemek amacıyla banka mevduatlarının geri çekilmesini sınırlandırdı. Bu durum yeni sosyal protestolara sebep oldu. Sonuçta Arjantin sosyal çalkantılarla televizyonları süslemeye ve uluslararası piyasalarda kredi alamaz bir konuma gelmeye başladı.

[B] Arjantin Krizinden Çıkarılabilecek Sonuçlar[/B]
Arjantin krizi ve krize giden süreçte IMF’ nin uygulamış olduğu politikalar ülkemiz gibi krizlerle boğuşmakta olan veya krizlerden en az hasarla etkilenmek isteyen ülkeler için önemli noktalara işaret etmektedir:

[LIST=1][*]Merkez Bankası’nın bağımsız para politikası sürdürebilmesi son derece önemlidir. Fakat bu bağımsızlık sadece kamu sektörü tarafından sağlanmamalı, uluslararası sermaye hareketlerine göre de desteklenmelidir. Özellikle ödemeler dengesinin cari işlemler kalemlerinde gerekli dengelerin henüz kurulamamış olduğu bir ortamda atılan sınırsız finansal serbesti adımı, Merkez Bankası’nı uluslararası finans piyasalarının basit bir döviz bürosu haline dönüştürmekte ve ulusal ekonomiyi yüksek reel faiz ve düşük kur sarmalında istikrarsızlığa sürüklemektedir.[*]Ulusal paranın yabancı paralarla ikamesi —dolarizasyon— ve devalüasyon beklentileri, özel sektör açısından yoğun bir risk kaynağı oluşturmakta ve mali piyasaların derinleşme sürecini geciktirmektedir. Finans piyasalarının serbestleştirilmesi sonucunda denetimsiz kalan özel sermayenin kısa dönemde aşırı riskli yatırımlara yönelmeyi tercih ettiği görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Merkez Bankası’nın para otoritesini kullanabilmesinin önemi bir kere daha öne çıkmaktadır.[*]Ulusal mali piyasalar, kısa vadeli yabancı sermaye hareketlerinin istikrarsızlık unsuru taşıyan spekülatif saldırılarına karşın korunmalıdır.[*]Döviz kurunu sabitleme yöntemi ile enflasyonu düşürme önemli ölçüde risk taşımaktadır. Her ne kadar bu işlem istikrar programına güven kazandırıyorsa da iç kapasite ve ihracatta rekabet gücü artırılmadan uygulanan bu işlem uzun vadede istikrarsızlık getirmektedir.[*]Büyük ölçüde dış borca bağlı olan bu IMF modeli reel ekonominin rekabet düzeyinin yeterince artırılmaması ve yurtiçi kaynakların yeterince kullanılmaması nedeniyle kusurludur. Bu model “Borç Tuzağı”nın üstesinden gelebilecek bir ekonomik yapıyı oluşturmada yetersiz kalmakta, ve ülkeleri dış şoklara savunmasız bırakmaktadır.[*]Ülkeler IMF nin önerilerinin ötesinde ufuklarını genişletebilmeli ve araştırma-geliştirme gibi iç rekabeti artırıcı metotlar uygulamalıdır; fakat bunun kamu yatırımlarının ertelendiği, mali kesintilerin yaşandığı bir ortamda yapılması zor gözükmektedir.[*]IMF programları Arjantin örneğinde ve diğer ülkelere uyguladığı programlarda olduğu gibi alınan önlemlerin ne gibi sosyal sonuçlar doğurabileceğini pek dikkate almamaktadır. Ayrıca Arjantin’de de görüldüğü gibi IMF programları doğrudan dış sermayenin haklarını korumaya yönelik olabilmektedir.[*]Sonuç olarak zengin tarihsel mirasına rağmen ,siyasi iktidarsızlık ve uzun süreli durgunluk sonucunda bir çıkmaza sürüklenmiş olan Arjantin on yıllık dönem içinde önce enflasyon probleminden kurtulmuş, fakat daha sonra daha büyük sorunlarla boğuşmak zorunda kalmıştır. Bu sorunlarda IMF’nin büyük rolü inkar edilmemekle birlikte Arjantin’in konumu,tarihsel gelişimi ve nispeten yeni olan demokratik düzeni de etkilidir.[/LIST]


[I][B]Kaynaklar:[/B]
[/I][I]”NEO-LİBERAL KÜRESELLEŞMENİN SINIRLARI: TÜRKİYE AÇISINDAN ARJANTİN KRİZİ VE IMF'YE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR BAKIŞ “ ,Ziya Öniş, Ekim 2002[/I]
[I]“Neoliberalizmin gözde ekonomisi Arjantin çökerken „ Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan, Birikim Dergisi, Şubat2002[/I]

USA: Deal struck but uncertainty has risen
Overview: Following more than a week of intense discussions between the Democrats and Republicans
over the initial bail-out plan put forward by Treasury Secretary Paulson last Sunday, a compromise was finally
reached this weekend (see details below). The main part of the proposal is intact – the Treasury will
set up a fund to buy troubled assets from financial institutions and it will have 45 days to set up guidelines
for the implementation of such purchases. The House of Representatives may consider the proposal today
and the Senate could vote by October 1. Although highly likely, it is not certain that the proposal will pass in
its current form.
There are, however, some new issues that were not included in the initial proposal. The most important in
our view are the following. First, the proposal of government insurance for troubled assets, which will help
to take out uncertainty in markets relating to the risk of further writedowns. Second, that if after five years
the TARF has a net loss, the president will be required to propose legislation that seek reimbursement from
participating financial institutions. That means that the risk related to the troubled assets is only removed
temporarily from banks balance sheets. While the programme buys the banks important time to recover
before bearing a possible loss the amendment to the initial proposal nevertheless adds uncertainty over the
“real” value of the financial institutions participating in the programme.
Assessment and outlook: Markets have not taken the news of a compromise proposal with much relief so
far. The financial crisis hit Europe hard over the weekend with a series of government bailouts, which is
likely to be an important factor keeping sentiment subdued (see details below). The events over the weekend
clearly underline that the fallout from the financial crisis is global and it is now hitting Euroland hard. In
the current market environment it is not difficult to imagine further victims in Euroland of the financial crisis
going forward.
Fundamentally, the proposal should remove uncertainty over future bankruptcies among the big players and
decrease systemic risk substantially. Banks are still going to see more losses related to consumer loans
and company loans as the US economy weakens further in the coming quarters. But by removing the uncertainty
over further writedowns on mortgage assets Treasury has gone to the core of the problem in the financial
crisis instead of only treating the symptoms. This should buy the financial sector important time to
raise the required capital and deleverage in an orderly fashion avoiding a major credit crunch for consumers
and cooperates.
However, uncertainty has increased in the past week. The strains in money markets have reached unprecedented
levels and the risk is that investors and market participants have lost faith that the medicine will
work. The current crisis has evolved into a confidence crisis which could become self-fulfilling. Market participants
are reluctant to engage in transactions with each other because of heightened counterparty risk
and fear that they could be the next in line to experience a “bank run” and therefore need all the liquidity
they can get themselves. The risk is that the crisis has now evolved so far that the bail-out plan is only just
enough to maintain the status quo, but is not enough to restore confidence and trust in markets.

F L A S H C O M M E N T
To grasp whether the proposal succeeds in restoring some confidence in markets we would first and foremost
watch developments in the US money market and financial equities in the US. While we do expect any
improvement to be gradual, as it takes time to rebuild confidence, we would need to see some progress in
US money markets relatively quickly, that is within the coming days and weeks. If the proposal is not enough
to ease strains in US money markets in the coming weeks, the risk that the current crisis will result in a severe
credit crunch for consumers and cooperates has definitely increased.
Details of the proposed compromise:
• Scale of the TARP: The bill authorises up to USD700bn for the Troubled Assets Relief Program
which will be paid in instalments. The Treasury will get USD250bn for the TARP right away with an
additional USD100bn immediately accessible. Congress would have the option of blocking the final
instalment of USD350bn by issuing a joint resolution within 15 days of any request.
• The implementation: The proposed legislation leaves the Treasury 45 days to set up the guidelines
for methods for pricing and valuing troubled assets, the mechanism for purchasing troubles assets,
procedures for selecting asset managers and criteria for identifying troubles assets for purchase.
The assets must be bought at “the lowest price that the Secretary of the Treasury determines to be
consistent with the purposes of this Act” either through auctions, reverse auctions or direct from
institutions. The Treasury expects to start buying the simplest assets first followed by more complex
securities.
• Timing: The House of Representatives may consider the proposal today and the Senate will vote by
October 1. It is not yet certain that the proposal will pass through Congress in its current form. Dependent
on the time it will take the Treasury to come up with the guidelines it would at the max take
45 days before the TARF can start purchasing assets.
• Protecting taxpayers: The Treasury will receive warrants in the companies that participate in the
programme. If a financial institution sells its assets trough an auction the Treasury will get a nominal
amount of non-voting warrants. If the Treasury buys assets directly it could get a majority equity
stake or debt position. In addition, if after a five-year period, the TARF has a net loss on its purchased
assets, the president is required to submit a legislative proposal to seek reimbursement
from the financial institutions that participated in the programme.
• Oversight: A bipartisan congressional commission will receive reports from the Treasury every 30
days. The programme will also be overseen by a board compromising the heads of the Treasury, the
Federal Reserve, the Securities & Exchange Commission, the Housing and Urban Development Department
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
• Executive compensation: In the case were the TARP has bought assets directly from a financial institution,
no “golden parachute” exit payments must be made as long as the Treasury holds an
ownership stake in the firm. Financial institutions that sell assets using a pricing method such as
auctions will be subject to limits on senior executive compensation as well.
• Helping homeowners: The legislation requires the Treasury to the extent that it holds, owns or controls
mortgages, MBS and other assets secured by residential real estate to implement a plan that
seeks to maximise assistance for homeowners and use its authority to encourage the servicers of
the underlying mortgages, considering the net present value to the taxpayer, to take advantage of
the HOPE programme to minimise foreclosures. In the case of a residential mortgage loan, modifi

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[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-1#topflop_Ank"]Fonds [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-2#topflop_Ank"]Preis [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-3#topflop_Ank"]Star- [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] Performance in %
Währung Rating * [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=4#topflop_Ank"]1 Monat [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_aktiv_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-5#topflop_Ank"]6 Monate [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-6#topflop_Ank"]1 Jahr [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-7#topflop_Ank"]3 Jahre [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/FondsPerformance.aspx?rub=%7B4F595DE0-EE44-4387-87C1-2E5D1E87257A%7D&id_kat=892&kat_name=Aktien+T%c3%bcrkei&topflop_srt=-8#topflop_Ank"]5 Jahre [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/sortierwinkel_down.gif[/IMG][/URL]
[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=FR0010326256"]LYXOR ETF DJ TURKEY TI... [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 34,19
EUR -- -9,15 % +7,57 % -32,22 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0269999362"]MARKET ACCESS DJ TURKE... [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 106,36
EUR -- -10,41 % +11,32 % -31,85 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0265293521"]PARVEST TURKEY C [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 100,13
EUR -- -11,22 % +3,12 % -34,58 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0085872058"]TURKISFUND EQUITIES A D [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 27,83
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -11,66 % -0,86 % -34,06 % -7,85 % +108,74 % [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=BE0946058170"]KBC EQUITY FD TURKEY ACC [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 683,58
TRY -- -11,75 % -14,24 % -42,26 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=AT0000704341"]ESPA STOCK ISTANBUL T [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 285,24
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -13,14 % -0,78 % -40,55 % -6,25 % +110,10 % [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=IE00B1FZS574"]ISHARES MSCI TURKEY USD [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 29,41
USD -- -13,26 % -3,97 % -34,74 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0093368008"]TÜRKEI 75 PLUS [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 90,15
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -15,05 % -2,25 % -40,30 % -6,25 % +82,02 % [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0212963259"]FORTIS L EQ TURKEY C [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 159,12
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -15,88 % -3,24 % -39,71 % +4,13 % -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=DK0060009835"]JYSKE INV TURKISH EQ [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 78,24
EUR -- -15,97 % -4,50 % -43,29 % -- -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=IE00B04R3B82"]MAGNA TURKEY FUND C [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 13,88
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -17,12 % -2,12 % -41,59 % -14,55 % -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0209404259"]DWS TÜRKEI [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 135,08
EUR [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -17,94 % -3,95 % -37,23 % -0,92 % -- [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]EMIF TURKEY INDEX PLUS... [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 335,36
USD [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/stern.gif[/IMG] -17,98 % -10,08 % -42,38 % +1,38 % +145,56 % [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?isin=LU0307972215"]VV MADAUS - STRATEGY T... [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] 66,77
EUR -- -21,83 % -7,53 % -- -- -- [URL="http://corporate.morningstar.com/de/documents/MethodologyDocuments/FactSheets/DE_MorningstarRatingForFunds_FactSheet.pdf"]* Morningstar Rating[/URL]

EMIF TURKEY INDEX PLUS CAP USD

[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk&news=faz&for=print"]Druckversion[/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds1.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk&news=faz&for=print"][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/invest/drucken.gif[/IMG][/URL]



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[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/left18.gif[/IMG] Übersicht [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/div18.gif[/IMG][URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds2.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk"] Details [/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/div18.gif[/IMG][URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds3.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk"] Porträt [/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/div18.gif[/IMG][URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds4.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk"] Kennzahlen [/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/div18.gif[/IMG][URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds5.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk"] Chart [/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/div18.gif[/IMG][URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?rub=%7B698B4DEC-6FE3-45FC-B1EC-A6BD8CA0CD94%7D&isin=LU0120085039&hpl=werk"] Struktur [/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/NewButton/left18.gif[/IMG]
1 Jahr[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds5.aspx?chart=2&isin=LU0120085039"][IMG]http://chart.faz.is-teledata.com/small.chart?ID_NOTATION=4927232&TIME_SPAN=1Y[/IMG][/URL]
[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds2.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds2.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]Kursdaten[/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] Rücknahmepreis 335,36 USD Ausgabepreis 335,36 USD Datum/Zeit 29.09.08/10:00 Diff. Vortag % -3,41 % Diff. Vortag -11,83
Tageshoch 335,36 Tagestief 335,36 Jahreshoch 590,51 Jahrestief 297,77 52W Hoch 640,44 52W Tief 297,77

3 Jahre[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds5.aspx?chart=3&isin=LU0120085039"][IMG]http://chart.faz.is-teledata.com/small.chart?ID_NOTATION=4927232&TIME_SPAN=3Y[/IMG][/URL]
[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]Struktur[/URL][IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]Ländergewichtung [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] sonstige 100 %
[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]Branchengewichtung [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] Verschiedenes 100 %
[URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds6.aspx?isin=LU0120085039"]Größte Positionen [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] TÜRKIYE GARANTI... 13,17 % EREGLI DEMIR VE... 9,30 % Verschiedene 77,53 % !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!



5 Jahre[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/Fonds5.aspx?chart=4&isin=LU0120085039"][IMG]http://chart.faz.is-teledata.com/small.chart?ID_NOTATION=4927232&TIME_SPAN=5Y[/IMG][/URL] FAZ.NET Meldungen[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [URL="http://www.faz.net/s/Rub645F7F43865344D198A672E313F3D2C3/Doc%7EE4A0E23F282F24499A5289AE4FFCB7E37%7EATpl%7EEcommon%7ESspezial.html"]23.04.2007 17:40[/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/s/Rub645F7F43865344D198A672E313F3D2C3/Doc%7EE4A0E23F282F24499A5289AE4FFCB7E37%7EATpl%7EEcommon%7ESspezial.html"]Fondsmedaillen: Malaysia, Singapur und die Türkei[/URL]
[URL="http://www.faz.net/s/Rub645F7F43865344D198A672E313F3D2C3/Doc%7EE79C9D31E9BF64F77AF54B27DE11F46C0%7EATpl%7EEcommon%7EScontent.html"]30.06.2006 16:11[/URL] [URL="http://www.faz.net/s/Rub645F7F43865344D198A672E313F3D2C3/Doc%7EE79C9D31E9BF64F77AF54B27DE11F46C0%7EATpl%7EEcommon%7EScontent.html"]Türkei-Interview: „Ich habe die Gegenbewegung unterschätzt“[/URL]
Stammdaten[IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/tb_ecke.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/leer.gif[/IMG] Kategorie [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/TopsFlops1.aspx?isin=LU0120085039&typ=71"]Aktienfonds [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] Fondswährung USD Geschäftsjahr -- Fondsvol. 17,55 Mio. EUR KAG KBC Asset Management [URL="http://www.faz.net/d/invest/list/KAGs.aspx?iss=51613"]weitere Fonds der KAG [IMG]http://www.faz.net/img/winkel.gif[/IMG][/URL] ISIN LU0120085039 Symbol

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Sinking Rapidly Into Depression
by [URL="http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/Experts/MartinDWeissPhD.aspx"]Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D.[/URL] 10-06-08

[IMG]http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/1107/martin-weiss.jpg[/IMG] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]This is the crisis that will change the course of history.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Even before ivory-tower theorists have gotten around to officially calling it a "recession," the U.S. economy is already sinking rapidly into depression.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And even as the government has vowed to embark on a $700 billion spending spree to avert financial panic, over $1 trillion in wealth has been wiped out in just five days of stock and bond market declines.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Cheap credit, the lifeblood of the U.S. economy, has nearly vanished from the scene.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul — the norm for decades in the consumer and corporate world — is becoming next to impossible.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Greed has been replaced by fear; euphoria, by panic; trust, by suspicion.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Everywhere, we see vicious cycles of mutual financial destruction:[/FONT]

[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Falling prices driving homeowners to abandon their homes ... and fire sales on foreclosed homes driving prices into a steeper tailspin.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Strangled consumers falling behind on their credit cards ... and credit card losses compelling banks to choke the available credit for consumers.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Wall Street panic smashing Main Street business ... and Main Street business sowing the seeds for more Wall Street panic.[/FONT][/LIST]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The probable consequences: Astronomical unemployment rates and intense hardship for millions of Americans; devastating losses for investors in almost every asset class; and, ultimately, deep depression and deflation (falling prices).[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]I wish that, somehow, this crisis could have been averted. But now that the bombs have been dropped, there's not much chance we can avoid the explosions that typically follow.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The U.S. government's giant bailout may buy some time and buffer some pain. But no matter how hard it may try, it cannot force banks to make risky loans or compel investors to buy sinking bonds. No government can repeal the law of gravity. No force can turn back the clock.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But you and I [I]will[/I] get through this — together.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]My team and I have everything we need to continue our operations in any foreseeable disaster. We will be here to guide you through thick and thin. And when it's all over, we will be ready to start anew, hopefully on a steadier, more wholesome path.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]This Is Not the End of the World;
It's Just the End of a Crazy Era.[/B][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Our country has a cornucopia of resources and a wealth of knowledge. Even after a great fall, we will still have the elements for a great recovery.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Inevitably, this decline will deliver severe financial losses to most of those who endure it. But it can also deliver long-lasting benefits to all those who survive it.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]If I'm right about the ultimate outcome, burdensome debts will be liquidated. Wild spending will be replaced with prudent saving. Unaffordable luxuries could give way to affordable bargains. And after the worst is over, thousands of new, innovative companies will burst onto the scene with clean balance sheets and a new vision.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Therefore, throughout our journey together — regardless of how dark the tunnel may appear — always remember the benefits. Relax your reactive impulses. Breathe what we trust will be a new atmosphere of collective sacrifice. Let time work its wonders.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]But Don't Expect a Recovery To Come Easily or Quickly.
The Deepest Declines of All Are Still Dead Ahead.[/B][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A recovery certainly won't come from Washington's $700 billion bailout boondoggle. It's too little, too late to avert a debt collapse. At the same time, it's too much, too soon for all those who will be asked to pay for it.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]For the evidence, see [URL="http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/files/documents/Final-Bailout-White-Paper.pdf"]our white paper submitted to Congress on September 25[/URL]. The highlights:[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT]
[LIST=1][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The FDIC's list of problem banks includes only 117 U.S. institutions with assets of $78 billion. But the list has a fatal deficiency:

[/FONT]
[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]It did not include any of the large banks that have failed or been forced to merge this year.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Our list did. And that list shows there are 1,479 U.S. banks and 258 thrifts at risk of failure with total assets of $3.2 trillion, [I]41 times more than estimated by the FDIC.[/I] This number alone illustrates the shock and awe ahead for anyone expecting the new bailout law to bring about a real recovery.

[/FONT][/LIST]
[*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The government seems to assume that our debt problems can be resolved by focusing on banks with financial assets gone bad. But the reality is that bad debts are everywhere:

[/FONT]
[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]At Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and other government agencies, $5.4 trillion in residential mortgages continue to rot.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Beyond residential mortgages, there are $2.6 trillion in commercial mortgages.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And beyond all mortgages, there are another $20.4 trillion in consumer and corporate debts — all subject to the same kind of surging delinquency rates we saw in subprime mortgages.

[/FONT][/LIST]
[*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The government's bailout plan is designed to help clean up debts that have gone bad so far. But what about debts that turn sour from this point forward? Do our leaders assume the economic decline is going to stop on a dime? Don't they see that the decline is actually gaining momentum?

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The bailout plan does nothing to address the $182 trillion maze of bets called derivatives. Nor does it take into consideration the fact that our nation's three largest banks — Citibank, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America — are exposed to far more credit risk on their derivatives than they have in capital.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In sum, even after committing $200 billion for Fannie-Freddie, $85 billion for AIG, $25 billion for the auto industry, $700 billion for the Wall Street bailout, another $150 billion tacked on to the plan for pork and tax cuts, plus hundreds of billions in emergency loans from the Fed ... the government's rescue is [I]still[/I] too small to cope with the tens of trillions of souring debts and bets in a sinking economy.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]At the same time, the government's bailout commitments made so far — now exceeding $1.5 trillion — are [I]already[/I] too much for those who will be asked to foot the bill or lend the money:

[/FONT]
[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Even before these bailouts, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projected the 2009 federal deficit would rise to $482 billion.

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Now, in just three weeks, the government has effectively chartered a course to [I]triple[/I] that deficit.

[/FONT][/LIST]
[*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In practice, the only way the government can try to raise that much money is by [I]borrowing it[/I]. And to the degree that it does so, the only possible outcome is huge upward pressure on the interest rates that consumers, corporations and local governments have to pay for mortgages and loans. That can't make the debt crisis go away. It can only make it many times worse.[/FONT][/FONT][/LIST]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]The Day of Reckoning Is Today —
Monday, October 6, 2008[/B][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Today is the day we'll learn whether the global financial markets will welcome the giant bailout plan with open arms ... or reject it with grim disdain. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]If the latest events are any indication, it will be the latter, and the markets will crash like never before. Look at what's happened in just the past 72 hours:[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]First[/B], immediately after the great bailout plan was signed by the president on Friday, the Dow plunged 474 points from peak to close. Not exactly a welcome reception! [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Second,[/B] on Saturday, the previously agreed-to bailout of Germany's second biggest property lender, Hypo, fell apart at the seams, sending government officials scurrying to come up with an alternative deal. But the amounts needed are huge: 20 billion euros by the end of next week, 50 billion euros by the end of the year, and as much as 100 billion euros by the end of 2009. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Third, [/B]UniCredit — the biggest bank in Italy, whose shares have been plunging lately — is trying to raise $9 billion in capital to stay afloat. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Over the weekend, even the country of Iceland has been shopping for a bailout. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Yes, stock markets can sometimes behave in perverse ways — plunging on good news, rallying on bad news and confusing the pundits on virtually [I]any[/I] news. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But the world's vast credit markets rarely lie. These are the markets where corporations and governments sell their bonds, notes and short-term paper to investors in exchange for cash.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]These markets are far larger than the stock markets. And they are driven by traders who typically are among the first to see through the hype and fluff that pours daily out of Washington or Wall Street.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Join me for a sprint on my time machine — this time, going back just three weeks. Then follow along through each major turning point, and you'll see what I mean ...[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]New York City, September 15.[/B] Officials from the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department have called together the heads of the biggest financial companies over the weekend. Their mission: To avert the inevitable meltdown that would ensue if two of Wall Street's largest firms — Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch — went down.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Merrill has a buyer; Lehman doesn't. So a Lehman bailout is on the table, following the pattern of the Bear Stearns bailout six months earlier.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But after back-to-back handouts week after week, some officials are fed up; they're losing their appetite for more of the same. Instead of a Bear Stearns-type rescue, a vocal minority is arguing forcefully to make an example of Lehman, to let the firm fail.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"Let's teach 'em a lesson," they say. "Let's send the message to complacent investors that risk in the marketplace is not dead after all."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]They assume the financial system is strong enough to withstand the shock. But they assume wrong ...[/FONT]
[IMG]http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/1107/lehman-bros-boxes.jpg[/IMG] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]September 16.[/B] It's Monday morning. In one fell swoop, 158 years of Lehman Brothers' history has been extinguished. Employees are saying their farewells. On 7th Avenue, dozens are carting off boxes of personal belongings.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]As these images are transmitted via the Internet and the wire services to the far corners of the financial world, there's a vague sense that something different is happening: For decades, an invisible glass shield called "trust" has protected global financial markets. But on this day, that shield has been shattered.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Suddenly, we have crossed into a new world of mistrust. Instantly, lenders have lost respect for borrowers, banks have lost confidence in fellow banks, and buyers are suspicious of nearly all sellers.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Several pivotal debt markets — already weakened by the on-again, off-again credit crunch that began over a year ago — are now plunging into a new, more acute phase of panic.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The market for commercial paper, the primary source of quick cash for thousands of corporations, is going into convulsions. A giant money market fund is "breaking the buck" — falling below $1 per share, due to huge losses in its Lehman Brothers' commercial paper.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Libor, the international standard for interest rates that banks pay each other for short-term loans, is surging. The cost of credit default swaps, a type of insurance against big company failures, is skyrocketing.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]While world credit markets are in turmoil, U.S. government officials are in shock. Their "let's-teach-'em-a-lesson" theory is dead at birth ... and in its place, and a new "Mother of All Bailouts" is in gestation.[/FONT]
[IMG]http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/1107/bernanke-bush.jpg[/IMG] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]White House Rose Garden, September 19.[/B] In 1930, even on the brink of the Great Depression, America's highest officials dared not warn the public of a financial panic.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But today, appearing before the press in the Rose Garden, the nation's three most powerful economic decision-makers — President Bush, Treasury Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke — are doing just that: They're warning of a financial meltdown.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]They're deliberately taking a monumental risk with the public psyche, and they're doing so for a single-minded reason — to help justify the greatest government rescue of all time: $700 billion, or nearly five times more than the entire economic stimulus package that came — and went — earlier this year.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Why are they doing it today of all days? Why are they in such a great hurry? Because they can see, with their own eyes, the seizures in the credit markets. By announcing a mega-bailout, with all the fanfare and theatre they can muster, they hope they can restore confidence in the credit markets and stem the flood of panicky selling.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But despite the high drama, and despite knee-jerk euphoria in the stock market, the credit markets barely blink. The credit convulsions continue unabated. Trust is not restored. Confidence continues to sink.[/FONT]
[IMG]http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/1107/window.jpg[/IMG] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Capitol Hill, Sunday, September 28. [/B]After a long weekend burning the midnight oil, Congressional leaders of both parties are announcing a "done deal" with "solid bipartisan support."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]New York, September 29, 11 AM. [/B]Despite the "near certainty" of a deal in Congress, credit market investors are still not impressed. The Libor rate is still rising. The cost of credit default swaps is still surging. Commercial paper buyers are still in hiding.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Same day, 1:15 PM. [/B]Just a few minutes ago, in stunning defiance of President Bush, the House of Representatives has rejected the bailout package by a vote of 228 to 205. The news is exploding on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange like a neutron bomb, sending the Dow into a 778-point tailspin for the day and throwing credit markets into virtual cardiac arrest.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Thursday, October 2. [/B]While Congress scrambles to recover, Fed Chairman Bernanke — along with his counterparts at foreign central banks across the globe — have jumped in to try to fill the gaping hole left by the U.S. Congress' failure to pass the bailout legislation. In just a few short days, they've injected an astounding $1 trillion into the global financial system, doubling, tripling and quadrupling their already-extraordinary prior infusions during previous bouts of the 13-month-old credit crisis.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][I]But even these huge amounts aren't enough.[/I] Several foreign banks are falling by the wayside. Trust continues to erode. Credit continues to vanish from the marketplace. More seizures sweep through the global credit markets.[/FONT]
[IMG]http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/1107/bush.jpg[/IMG] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Washington, Friday, October 3. [/B]Congress has stuffed the rescue bill with pork ... Republicans and Democrats who opposed the legislation on Monday have caved in ... the House has voted "aye" ... and the President has rushed to sign it into law.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"Now, finally," they say with a great sigh of relief, "the markets will give us their blessing. Now, finally, we can put this debt crisis behind us."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Ironically, however, even after all the political arm-twisting and even after all the added billions, the package [I]still[/I] doesn't seem to be enough to calm credit markets. Quite the contrary, the Libor rate has risen even further. The cost of credit default swaps continues to make new highs. Commercial paper buyers continue to recoil in horror.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Surprising as it may seem, despite the greatest central bank money infusions ever ... despite the largest government bailout package of all time ... the credit crisis is [I]not[/I] ending.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Back To the Present[/B][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]You read these words on your screen or in a printout. And you say: "All this is unbelievable. Give me proof." OK. Here it is ...[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B][COLOR=#990000]Proof #1.[/COLOR][/B] [URL="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a3XxHxuFdhME&refer=home"]Bloomberg[/URL], October 3: "The market for commercial paper plummeted the most on record as banks and insurers were unable to find buyers for the short-term debt amid the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression. Commercial paper outstanding tumbled $94.9 billion."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B][COLOR=#990000]Proof #2.[/COLOR][/B] [URL="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a0JbUyhTA71Y&refer=home"]Bloomberg[/URL], also October 3: "Leveraged loan prices plunged to all-time lows ... and even the safest company bonds suffered the worst losses in at least two decades as investors flocked to Treasuries. Credit markets have frozen and money-market rates keep rising even after central banks pumped an unprecedented $1 trillion into the financial system."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B][COLOR=#990000]Proof #3.[/COLOR][/B] Citigroup is in danger:[/FONT]

[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][URL="https://secure3.thestreet.com/StoreFront/"]TheStreet.com Ratings[/URL] has just downgraded the Financial Strength Rating of Citi's main banking unit from C- (fair) to D+ (weak).

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Separately, Weiss Research finds that Citigroup's global credit card portfolio — 185 million accounts with $201 billion — is in jeopardy with credit losses mounting. And nearly every single category of consumer loans is suffering dramatic increases in delinquency rates ([URL="http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/qer082s.pdf?ieNocache=952"]Citigroup's June 30 Quarterly Financial Data Supplement[/URL], pages 10 and 15).[/FONT][/LIST]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B][COLOR=#990000]Proof #4.[/COLOR][/B] Silent bank runs — mass withdrawals by institutional investors — are hitting some major banks, accelerating the credit crisis even more:[/FONT]

[LIST][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]At Washington Mutual, the biggest bank failure in history, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) reports $16.7 billion in cash withdrawals in just nine business days ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/withdrawals-customers-ultimately-sank-wamu/story.aspx?guid=%7B7F09D20B-7B91-48F1-98D6-E92F47C73FA7%7D&dist=hpts"]MarketWatch[/URL]).

[/FONT][*][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]At Wachovia, when the bank opened on Monday, it's reported that it would have had no other source of liquidity if the FDIC had not stepped in to arrange a shotgun marriage with another major bank ([URL="http://www.charlotteobserver.com/business/story/226799.html"]Charlotte Observer[/URL]). But which is the groom — Citigroup or Wells Fargo? Based on a judge's decision this weekend, the answer is now up in the air, another source of uncertainty for investors and depositors.[/FONT][/LIST]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B][COLOR=#990000]Proof #5.[/COLOR][/B] In a thinly veiled attempt to stem the bank runs, the FDIC is changing its rules: The new bailout law now includes a jump from $100,000 to $250,000 in FDIC coverage limits for depositors.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But it's unlikely this will be enough to significantly slow the outflows from banks. Reason: Too many banks may be relying too heavily on large, uninsured deposits that are not affected by the change. (For the data, see Weiss Research's latest press release and report, "[URL="http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/EventsandFeedback/PressReleases.aspx?Banks-Overly-Reliant-on-Hot-Money-Deposits"]Many Banks and Thrifts Overly Reliant on 'Hot Money' Deposits[/URL].")[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]All this evidence leads you to a single obvious conclusion: The crisis is gaining momentum and worsening at an even more rapid pace.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Perhaps not so obvious is whether the long-term outcome might be ...[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Inflation or Deflation?[/B][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Clearly, ours is a debt-addicted society.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Without debt, U.S. consumers, corporations, local governments and, ultimately, even the federal government must cut spending drastically, driving down demand.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And without demand, most prices for goods and services are bound to plummet.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]That's deflation ... unless, of course, the government can somehow end the debt crisis ... unless the Fed can print money in unlimited amounts ... and unless that money turns the threat of deflation into the specter of hyperinflation.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Which will it be? Watch the credit markets. As long as they continue to contract, they're telling you that ...[/FONT]
[INDENT] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]This collapse is bigger than any government: Despite the inflationary spending and bailouts, ultimately, [I][COLOR=#990000]DEFLATION[/COLOR] [/I]is the more likely outcome.[/B][/FONT][/INDENT][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]If so, that implies the real possibility of further declines in some of the markets that previously were among the biggest winners, including foreign currencies, foreign stock markets and industrial commodities.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Nearly two months ago, in his August [I]Real Wealth Report[/I], Larry Edelson explained it this way: "The U.S. economy is dealing with a pricing collapse. It's a deflationary spiral in a global recession that will lead to depression" — all in the broader context of major, long-term bull markets in commodities.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Regardless of inflation or deflation, however, there's always money to be made in a great crisis like this one — on the way up since the early part of the century ... on the way down in a period of deflation ... and on the way up [I]again[/I] once the deflationary period has passed.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And no matter happens in the months ahead, your number one priority right now must be [B][I][COLOR=#990000]safety and liquidity.[/COLOR][/I][/B] [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Move most of your money into the safest, most liquid investment on the planet — 3-month T-bills bought directly from the Treasury or a Treasury-only money market fund.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]For specific instructions on how to buy short-term Treasuries, see my September 30 report, "[URL="http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/Issues.aspx?Urgent-from-Martin-Your-Last-Chance-to-Act-2358"]Your Last Chance to Act[/URL]."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And for answers to all your urgent questions, join our emergency online Q&A session this week.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]The time:[/B] Friday, October 10 at 12 Noon Eastern Time.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Promotion and sales content: [/B]None.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]Free registration:[/B] [U][URL="http://events.moneyandmarkets.com/index.aspx?t=43&sc=p446&ec=87684"]Click here.[/URL][/U] [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][B]More information:[/B] See "[URL="http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/Issues.aspx?Why-Im-Deeply-Concerned-and-What-Im-Doing-2374"]Why I'm Deeply Concerned and What I'm Doing[/URL]."[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But beware: If you don't reserve your spot ahead of time right now, you could miss it.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Good luck and God bless![/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Martin[/FONT]

[B]Tuerkei-Fonds von KBC enttaeuschen[/B]

So stimmig die KBC-Analyse ist, die zwei Tuerkei-Fonds des Hauses der [B]KBC Equity Fund Turkey (WKN A0MRMD)[/B] sowie der [B]EMIF Turkey (WKN 592897)[/B] reuessierten bislang nicht. Beide Fonds werden von Bart Daenekindt betreut. Der KBC Equity Fund Turkey wird aktiv gemanagt und soll den MSCI Turkey Index schlagen.

Noch ist Daenekindt dies allerdings nicht gelungen. Kein anderer Tuerkei-Fonds weist derzeit eine schlechtere Performance auf. Der EMIF Turkey ist dagegen ein Indexfonds, der den MSCI Turkey Index abbildet. Der [B]iShares MSCI Turkey (DE) ETF (WKN A0LGQN)[/B] bewaeltigte dies jedoch erfolgreicher.

[B]DWS Tuerkei bester aktiv gemanagter Tuerkei-Fonds[/B]

Der DWS Tuerkei hingegen war ueber die vergangenen drei Jahre der erfolgreichste aktiv gemanagte Tuerkei-Fonds. Auch wenn der Fonds im laufenden Jahr mit rund 40 Prozent in den roten Zahlen liegt. "Die tuerkischen Unternehmen sind sehr umtriebig und erfolgreich auf den internationalen Maerkten. Zurzeit steht das negative globale Sentiment aber stark im Vordergrund", sagt Fondsmanager Sebastian Kahlfeld

Bu son mesajda ne demişler bunlar?

Kayahannnn iki satır türkçe altına çiziktiriverseydin:) Türkiye için bişey demişlerde:)

[B]US-Konjunktur: Verbraucherkredite stark eingebrochen[/B]

Datum 07.10.2008 - Uhrzeit 22:39 (© BörseGo AG 2000-2008, Autor: Hoyer Christian, Redakteur


[IMG]http://www.godmode-trader.de/front/ajax/data.php?function=updateReadCount&articleId=1004393&categoryId=24[/IMG]Washington (BoerseGo.de) – Laut der US-Notenbank Federal Reserve ist das Volumen der US-Verbraucherkredite im August um 7,9 Milliarden Dollar auf insgesamt 2,58 Billionen Dollar gefallen, was den ersten Rückgang seit dem Januar 1998 bedeutet. Der Umfang der kurzfristigen Schulden wie etwa Kreditkartenschulden fiel um 0,8 Prozent oder 612 Millionen Dollar auf 969 Milliarden Dollar. Die Kreditkartenbenutzung macht etwa 40 Prozent aller Konsumentenkredite aus. Die Mehrheit sind sogenannte nicht-revolvierende Kredite (Kredite zum Kauf eines neuen Autos, Finanzierung eines Urlaubs oder Ausbildung), die im August einen Rückgang von 5,4 Prozent oder 7,3 Milliarden auf 1,61 Billionen Dollar verzeichnen. .dng.dng.kom.lelele:dü:.brv

[B]21.52[/B] Die Aktien der US-Bank [URL="http://www.ftd.de/ticker/US6174464486.N"]Morgan Stanley[/URL] haben am Dienstag [B]rund 25 Prozent an Wert verloren[/B]. Der Kurs gab bis zum Nachmittag New Yorker Zeit um fast 6 $ nach. Hintergrund sind Medienberichte, wonach die japanische Bank [URL="http://markets.ftd.de/stocks/factsheet_overview.html?ID_NOTATION=2590138"]Mitsubishi UFJ[/URL] doch nicht [B]wie geplant mit 20 Prozent bei dem angeschlagenen Institut einsteigen könnte[/B]. Morgan Stanley wies die Befürchtungen zurück - dem Aktienkurs half das nicht.


japonlar morgen stanley'e yardim etmekten vaz gecmis!!!!.dng:dü:



$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

ABD VATANDASLARI son 15 ayda finansal krizde 2 trilyon$ para kaybetmisler. abd kongresi raporuna gore!!!.dng



[B]21.38[/B] Die Pensionskassen der US-Bürger haben als Folge der Finanzmarktkrise in den vergangenen 15 Monaten [B]2000 Mrd. $[/B] verloren. Diese Zahl nannte am Dienstag der Leiter der Kongress-Rechnungsbehörde CBO, Peter Orszag, vor einem Ausschuss des Repräsentantenhauses. Der untersucht derzeit, wie sich die Immobilien- und Bankenkrise auf die Pensionskassen auswirkt. Viele Arbeitnehmer würden wegen der Verluste wahrscheinlich gezwungen, auf [B]größere Konsumausgaben zu verzichten[/B] und [B]mehr zu sparen[/B] - oder [B]später in Rente zu gehen[/B], sagte Orszag.

sayın kayahan imkb çöcek diye diye çökerttiniz peki düşüş hedefiniz nedir ? bir hedefiniz varmı nerde durur endeks sizce

geçen gün için kusura bakma arkadaş....

sadece senden forum adına bir özür görmek yerine........
ortadan kaybolmanla yaşanan ralli sonrası tekrar yazılarını görünce ve sonrası bir tepki daha yaşanması ile kendimi kaybettim....seni başka tarz insanlarla karıştırdım ve yazdım.....

tekrar kusura bakma yolunda devam et.....

iyi çalışmalar...

[INDENT] THE GLOBAL DEFLATIONARY CREDIT CRASH:
A credit contraction which becomes deflationary takes the prices of most
or all economic goods and financial assets down with it. If some of these
economic goods were used as collateral for other loans, the fall in
collateral values cuts right in under of the safety of the loans, causing the
lenders huge losses. Once the lenders’ capital is exhausted, they too go
broke. That undercuts ALL the other deposits people have in place with
the lenders. This is happening right now. Once other depositors get
scared - they run! That too is happening - right now.
[B]First, people run towards a “safer” institution. Then, to a “safer” place.[/B]
The Penultimate Stage Of The Credit Collapse:
Ever since the era of “fractional reserve” banking and government deficit spending began, the great fear of
bankers and governments has always been a situation where the people fled the “safety” of financial
institutions for literal CASH. On the Inside The European Union page in this issue, we speak of “Bank
Runs Lateral And REAL”. The “lateral” runs are on in earnest as money is extracted from the “markets”
and transferred from commercial to state-owned “savings” banks. There is a huge stampede into
government-guaranteed accounts. This is so far a lateral bank run. The money is staying inside the
system, but it is not helping the banks because their ability to use it to lend new money into existence is
curtailed. In recent days, there have been more and more reports about the withdrawing of actual CASH.
Should this tendency to withdraw cash intensify in coming days and weeks, we will have reached the
“penultimate” stage of this deflationary credit crash.
[B]The LAST stage is the one where the public’s
“confidence” in the actual CASH erodes. At that point, there is a stampede into real goods and real[/B][/INDENT]

09.10.2008
Einlagensicherung [B][B]Bei welcher Bank ist mein Geld sicher?[/B][/B]

[B]Mit ihrer aggressiven Kundenwerbung in Deutschland steht die Kaupthing[IMG]http://bc3.handelsblatt.com/images/icon/loading.gif[/IMG] Bank nicht alleine da. Auch zahlreiche andere ausländische Banken werben mit hohen Zinsen auf Tagesgeld und Festgeld um deutsche Kunden. Doch die Sicherheit der Einlagen bei den Anbietern mit den Top-Konditionen ist sehr unterschiedlich.[/B]
[IMG]http://bc1.handelsblatt.com/ShowImage.aspx?img=2065277&width=168&height=168[/IMG][URL="javascript:void()"][IMG]http://bc3.handelsblatt.com/images/icon/ico_image_lupe.gif[/IMG][/URL]
Bankenstadt Frankfurt: Die Konditionen der Institute sind sehr unterschiedlich. Foto: AP

HB DÜSSELDORF. Die Advanzia Bank, die mit 5,85 Prozent im Moment den höchsten Tagesgeldsatz bietet, fällt unter die luxemburgische Sicherung. Einlagen sind hier bis 50 000 Euro sind geschützt. Lediglich 20 000 Euro sind bei der.kom Deniz Bank und der Vakifbank gesichert, beides österreichische Töchter türkischer Institute.
Ein Institut nach niederländischem Recht ist die Credit Europe Bank. Die Einlagen sind hier bis 100 000 Euro staatlich gesichert. Das gleich gilt für die GarantiBank und die Akbank N.V., die ihren Sitz in Rotterdam hat und eine Niederlassung in Essen betreibt.
Die Akbank AG mit Sitz in Frankfurt ist hingegen Mitglied im Einlagensicherungsfonds des Bundesverbandes der Deutschen Banken, im Rahmen dessen die Einlagen von Anlegern bis zur Höhe von 30 Prozent des haftenden Eigenkapitals der Bank, welches derzeit rund 200 Mio. Euro beträgt, abgesichert sind..kom
Genauso verhält es sich bei der indischen ICICI Bank. Auch sie ist Mitglied im Einlagensicherungsfonds der deutschen Privatbanken. Einlagen jedes einzelnen Kunden sind deshalb bis in eine Höhe von 30 Prozent des Eigenkapitals der Bank gesichert, das heißt, für die meisten Kunden de facto unbegrenzt.
Den gleichen Weg geht die spanische Großbank komplett gesichert. Gleiches gilt für die türkische Ziraat Bank, die freiwillig dem Einlagensicherungsfonds des Bundesverbandes Deutscher Banken beigetreten ist.

[B]5,50 Prozent: Akbank hebt Tagesgeldzins an[/B]

Artikel erstellt am Dienstag, 30. September 2008 von [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/author/dethenke/"]Detlef Henke[/URL] | Kommentare: 7
Kategorie: [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/allgemein/"]Allgemein[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/festgeld/"]Festgeld[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/tagesgeld/"]Tagesgeld[/URL] Tags: [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Bank"]Bank[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/deutsch"]deutsch[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Einkauf"]Einkauf[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Euro"]Euro[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Festgeld"]Festgeld[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Geb%C3%BChren"]Gebühren[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Geld"]Geld[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Gesch%C3%A4ft"]Geschäft[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Kunde"]Kunde[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Tagesgeld"]Tagesgeld[/URL], [URL="http://www.geld-kompakt.de/category/Tier"]Tier[/URL]

Kennen Sie die Akbank? Die Bank trägt in Holland, England und Deutschland den Namen Akbank N.V. Ihren Hauptsitz hat sie in den Niederlanden, in der schönen Einkaufsstadt Essen befindet sich die deutsche Niederlassung.
Die Akbank N.V. ist ein Tochterunternehmen der wohl größten türkischen Geschäftsbank, Akbank T.A.S. Die Akbank ist nicht Mitglied im Einlagensicherungsfonds des Bundesverbands deutscher Banken e.V. Sie ist Mitglied in der niederländischen Einlagensicherung. Konkret bedeutet das:

The selling has reached historic proportions. There literally is a “run on the market,” as investors worldwide are dumping stocks. It seems that the major catalyst for this selling is the fact that the newest large banks primarily J. P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and possibly Morgan Stanley as well — have issued massive margin calls to hedge funds and other professional traders who use these banks as prime brokers. These calls were not issued because of market losses, but more because the banks arbitrarily decided that they wanted their customers to use less leverage. Margin rates as low as 15% for broker dealers were raised to 35%; hedge funds who had been used to operating on high leverage were told that they had to bring accounts up to a much larger percentage of equity. In this illiquid environment, where all manor of exotic securities literally have no bids, the only place to raise the cash to meet margin calls was to sell stock. That is what really set this market over the edge — as the first notice of these calls were issued on October 2nd and 3rd. There was something of a grace period to meet the calls, but funds realized they weren’t going to be able to meet them other than by selling stock. There are rumors that the most massive of the calls are due Monday (October 13th). If so, this market could continue to decline through then.

[B]Financial crisis: Countries at risk of bankruptcy from Pakistan to Baltics [/B]

[B]A string of countries face the risk of "going bust" as financial panic sweeps Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, raising the spectre of a strategic crisis in some of the world's most dangerous spots. [/B]



By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Last Updated: 7:55PM BST 10 Oct 2008


Nuclear-armed Pakistan is bleeding foreign reserves at an alarming rate leading to fears that it could default on its loans.
There are mounting fears that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Argentina could all now slide into a downward spiral towards bankruptcy, while western banks exposed to property bubble across Eastern Europe have seen their share price crushed.
The markets are pricing an 80pc risk that Ukraine will default, based on five-year credit default swaps (CDS) – an insurance policy on a country being able to pay its debts.
The country's banking system has begun to break down after years of torrid credit growth; its steel mills are shutting as demand collapses; and the political crisis is going from bad to worse.
President Viktor Yushchenko dissolved parliament this week in a dispute that risks bitter conflict with the country's Russian bloc. Diplomats fear Moscow could be drawn into the crisis – or even use it as a pretext to occupy territory in a replay of the Georgia invasion this summer.
Ukraine's government seized Prominvestbank this week, suspending payments to creditors. It closed the Kiev stock market, which has fallen 73pc this year.
Emerging market stocks have been tumbling since their peak in October, when investors were still betting that rising stars such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) were now strong enough to shake off a US crisis. That illusion has been shattered.
The International Monetary Fund said it is mobilising a "rapid-fire" fund worth several hundred billion dollars to stop a domino collapse across the developing world.
The trigger for the latest round of capital flight has been the lightning implosion of Iceland. BNP Paribas warned clients yesterday that the island is heading for "sovereign default" with contagion risks for other economies that have been living beyond their means on foreign credit.
Hungary had to intervene yesterday to prop up its markets following a run on country's biggest lender OTP. The Budapest bourse fell 13pc. The treasury had to scrap a bond auction.
The most new mortgages in Hungary are in Swiss francs, leaving the homeowners facing a vicious squeeze as the forint plunges against the franc.
In Pakistan, the rupee has fallen to an all-time low. Standard & Poor's downgraded the country's sovereign debt to near write-off levels of CCC-plus. The central bank's foreign reserves have fallen to $4.7bn (£2.73billion).
"The danger of default is hovering," said Professor Kaisar Bengali from Karachi University.
"Pakistan may not be able to re-pay its debt or import anything," he said, adding that the country cannot assume that it will be bailed out for strategic reasons.
Default risk on Kazakhstan's top banks has risen to 70pc as property bubble bursts in the former Soviet republic and reliance in foreign credit comes back to haunt.
The country has mortgaged its future to oil prices, which crashed below $80 a barrel yesterday as the whole nexus of commodities (except gold) buckled in a wave of forced selling.
Analysts warn that it is leading indicator for what could happen if Russia if crude falls much further. .dng.dng.kom

EMERGING MARKETS REPORT
[B]Emerging markets tumble in global stock rout[/B]



By [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/news/mailto.asp?x=112+108+101+115+111+118+97&y=Polya+Lesova&z=marketwatch.com&guid=%7B0e4e5665-c68d-4a4b-b38e-58e76b3b31e9%7D&siteid=mktw"]Polya Lesova[/URL], MarketWatch
[COLOR=#A3A3A3]Last update: 5:00 p.m. EDT Oct. 10, 2008[/COLOR]
[IMG]http://i.mktw.net/mw3/community/images/btns/icons/site/comments.png[/IMG][URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/emerging-markets-tumble-some-countries/story.aspx?guid=%7B0E4E5665%2DC68D%2D4A4B%2DB38E%2D58E76B3B31E9%7D#comments"]Comments: 20[/URL]


[B]NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- Stocks from Thailand to Turkey and from India to the Czech Republic plunged into panic mode Friday, forcing trading suspensions on numerous emerging-market exchanges, as a collapse in investor confidence and fears about a global recession amplified selling pressures around the world. [/B]

[IMG]http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Image.aspx?Guid=0e4e5665c68d4a4bb38e58e76b3b31e9&Track=201[/IMG]

Stock exchanges in Iceland, Indonesia and Russia didn't even open, while steep declines forced trading halts in Thailand, Austria, Romania and Brazil.
As the global financial crisis has spread to nearly every corner of the world, many emerging markets have suffered dramatic declines this year, raising questions about their growth prospects.
"The outlook for emerging markets is good, but we can't put a specific timetable to the end of the year," said Mark Mobius, the veteran emerging markets investor and executive chairman of Templeton Asset Management, where he oversees some $30 billion in assets. [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/mobius-sees-buying-opportunities-emerging/story.aspx?guid=%7BE22E25F8%2D4A60%2D4ABE%2D9D54%2DB86BF24E9C79%7D"]Read more. [/URL]
"With the irrationality now hitting markets worldwide, it is impossible to guess the short-term direction of the market," Mobius told MarketWatch in emailed comments. "Needless to say, there are wonderful opportunities to buy, but that does not mean that prices can't go down further."
In Latin America, Brazil's Bovespa stock index tumbled as much as 10% in early trading in Sao Paulo, forcing the exchange to suspend trading for half an hour because of a circuit breaker.
Tracking a late rebound on Wall Street, the Bovespa recouped some losses to end down 4%.
Elsewhere in the region, Chile's IPSA index fell 3%, Mexico's IPC index dropped 2% and Argentina's Merval declined 6%. [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/stocks-slammed-across-region-risk-adverse/story.aspx?guid=%7BFBEEF5C0%2DBFF7%2D4CF0%2DA1BB%2DFB51B84F8250%7D"]Read more.[/URL]
"Panic has taken over as the credit crisis has compounded fears of a long, drawn-out economic recession."
— Analysts at RBC Capital Markets
On Wall Street, U.S. stocks rallied back from stiff losses to end mostly lower, capping the worst week ever for the Dow Jones Industrial Average ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/quotes//djia"]DJIA[/URL]:DJIA
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<img class="pixelTracking" border="0" width="1" height="1">[URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/quotes/quotes.asp?symb=DJIA"]DJIA[/URL], , ) and the S&P 500 ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/quotes//spx"]SPX[/URL]:S&P 500 Index
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<img class="pixelTracking" border="0" width="1" height="1">[URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/quotes/quotes.asp?symb=SPX"]SPX[/URL] 899.22, -10.70, -1.2%) . After trading in a 1,000-point range that had it down nearly 700 points, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 128 points, or 1.5%, to 8,451.19, down nearly 1,900 points, or 18.2%, for the week. [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/us-stock-indexes-looking-weekly/story.aspx?guid=%7BC902D7A5%2D33DA%2D4E7E%2D952F%2D9082B4401FEA%7D"]See Market Snapshot. [/URL]
There has been "equity-market carnage," said analysts at RBC Capital Markets in a research note. "Panic has taken over as the credit crisis has compounded fears of a long, drawn-out economic recession."
In the debt markets, the EMBI+ spread index soared 31 basis points to 567 basis points, according to data from RBC Capital Markets.
Eastern Europe hit hard
In Eastern Europe, Russian stock markets remained closed. The Czech Republic's PX stock index fell 15% and Poland's WIG 20 stock index dropped 8%. Turkey's IMKB-100 stock index declined 8%.
After dropping sharply earlier in the day, Hungary's BUX stock index reclaimed some ground to end down 3%.
In Romania, the Bucharest Stock Exchange was closed for trading during most of the session. The BET stock index tumbled 10%.
"The heavy selling continued in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe], and the markets here were dominated by fear," said Adrian Ciocoi, Bucharest-based head of research for emerging Europe at Riedel Research Group.
"Confidence is pretty much rock-bottom and investor sentiment is low," Ciocoi said. "The financial markets were knocked down and the white towel is going to be thrown ... increasing signs of capitulation."
In Asia, Japan's Nikkei and Thailand's SET indexes led the sharp declines. The SET index in Bangkok ended down 10% after halting trading temporarily due to circuit breakers.
India's Sensex stock index fell 7%. Hong Kong's Hang Seng index also tumbled 7%, while China's Shanghai Composite index fell 3.6%. [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/nikkei-slumps-end-week-24/story.aspx?guid=%7BE8F8480F%2D1B6A%2D4289%2D9BAE%2D6628C5A0F090%7D"]See Asia Markets. [/URL]
In New York, the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Fund ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/quotes//eem"]EEM[/URL]:iShares:MSCI Emerg Mkt
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<img class="pixelTracking" border="0" width="1" height="1">[URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/quotes/quotes.asp?symb=EEM"]EEM[/URL] 24.55, +1.38, +6.0%) , which tracks the performance of the MSCI Emerging Markets index, reversed earlier sharp losses and ended up 1%.
The Market Vectors Russia ETF ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/quotes//rsx"]RSX[/URL]:market vectors etf tr russia etf
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The prices of many commodities fell sharply, with the Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index ([URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/quotes//crb"]CRB[/URL]:reuters jefferies crb index price
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<img class="pixelTracking" border="0" width="1" height="1">[URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/quotes/quotes.asp?symb=CRB"]CRB[/URL] 289.89, -20.64, -6.6%) , a benchmark gauging the prices of major commodities, fell 7%.
Crude futures suffered their third-largest daily loss in dollar terms on the New York Mercantile Exchange, dropping to their lowest closing level since mid-September 2007. November crude closed at $77.70 per barrel, down $8.89, or 10.3%, for the session and down 17.2% for the week. Crude is down 47.2% from the record intraday high of $147.27 seen on July 11. [URL="http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/oil-ends-below-78-more/story.aspx?guid=%7BB2123CB3%2D760C%2D4C0A%2D918C%2D4219EBF06F23%7D"]See Futures Movers.[/URL]
Many emerging economies, such as Russia and Brazil, are major commodity exporters, and the recent plunge in commodities prices has taken its toll on them. [IMG]http://i.mktw.net/mw3/News/greendot.gif[/IMG].dng.dng

[B]Kolumne[/B]

[B]Banken gerettet, Staat pleite[/B]

[B]von [URL="http://www.ftd.de/meinung/leitartikel/:Kolumne-Banken-gerettet-Staat-pleite/426196.html?mode=autor"]Wolfgang Münchau [/URL][/B]

Mit dem europäischen Rettungspaket haben wir ein privates Kreditproblem womöglich in ein weltweites Solvenzproblem transformiert - wenn schließlich der globale Bondmarkt einbricht.
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ZUM THEMA
[LIST][*]Teilverstaatlichung von Banken: US-Regierung stutzt Abfindungen ([url]http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:Teilverstaatlichung-von-Banken-US-Regierung-stutzt-Abfindungen/425813.html[/url])[*]Dax & Stoxx-Schlussbericht: Erleichterung über Rettungspaket hält an ([url]http://www.ftd.de/boersen_maerkte/aktien/marktberichte/:Dax-Stoxx-Schlussbericht-Erleichterung-%FCber-Rettungspaket-h%E4lt-an/425838.html[/url])[*]Widerstand gegen Rettungspaket: Länder fürchten Doppel-Belastung ([url]http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:Widerstand-gegen-Rettungspaket-L%E4nder-f%FCrchten-Doppel-Belastung/426101.html[/url])[*]Das Rettungspaket: Hilfe mit Verfallsdatum ([url]http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:Das-Rettungspaket-Hilfe-mit-Verfallsdatum/425891.html[/url])[*]Teures Hilfspaket: Länder feilschen um Rettungsplan ([url]http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:Teures-Hilfspaket-L%E4nder-feilschen-um-Rettungsplan/425805.html[/url])[/LIST]

Das mit heißer Nadel gestrickte Rettungspaket der Bundesregierung und anderer europäischer Regierungen hat zwar am Montag die Märkte begeistert, das Problem aber nicht gelöst. Eine Garantie des gesamten Finanzmarkts, wie wir sie jetzt ausgesprochen haben, kann genau so ein Problem darstellen wie die Totalverweigerung zuvor. Europas Regierungen haben hier im Digitalmodus von null auf eins umgeschaltet. Wir fahren jetzt nicht mehr mit Vollgas auf eine Wand zu, sondern auf einen Abgrund. Unser Optimierungsproblem besteht darin, den Finanzsektor zu stabilisieren, ohne dabei den öffentlichen Sektor zu destabilisieren.
Den neuesten Zahlen der Bundesbank zufolge gibt es in Deutschland 2003 Banken, mit Aktiva von knapp 8000 Mrd. Euro. Das ist etwas mehr als das Dreifache des jährlichen Bruttoinlandsprodukts des Staates. Nicht all diese Aktiva sind schlecht, aber viele sind möglicherweise zu optimistisch bewertet. Ob ein Paket im Gesamtvolumen von 500 Mrd. Euro ausreicht oder nicht, weiß auch die Bundesregierung nicht. Dazu kommt noch, dass wir jetzt vor einem sehr starken globalen Abschwung stehen und dass wir trotz der Weigerung der Kanzlerin und ihres Finanzministers um ein großes Konjunkturpaket wahrscheinlich nicht herumkommen werden, ohne in einer Depression zu versinken.
Wenn wir jetzt das gesamte Bankwesen garantieren und danach womöglich noch die Versicherungen und die so mächtig überschätzte Autoindustrie mit staatlichen Hilfen abfedern wollen, dann wird die Luft für ein Konjunkturpaket dünn. Das Problem ist nicht einmal der europäische Stabilitätspakt - hier werden diesmal alle nur denkbaren Ausnahmen zugelassen. Das Problem liegt in der langfristigen Solvenz unseres Staates.
[B]Banken ohne Wert[/B]

Die von der Bundesregierung in Aussicht gestellten 500 Mrd. Euro entsprechen ungefähr 20 Prozent unseres Bruttoinlandprodukts. Das heißt, zumindest zeitweilig könnte die Schuldenquote von derzeit 63 Prozent auf rund 83 Prozent hochschnellen. Natürlich würde man später die teilverstaatlichten Banken wieder privatisieren, doch da wir uns jetzt einem ganz anderen Zeitalter für das globale Finanzsystem nähern, ist überhaupt nicht klar, ob wir uns da nicht etwas schönrechnen. Die meisten unserer 2003 Banken sind kaum etwas wert. Und selbst die wenigen soliden Banken werden weniger Gewinne einfahren und weniger Dividenden ausschütten als früher. Dass der Staat ein günstiges Geschäft machen wird, ist unwahrscheinlich. Ich würde hier jede sogenannten Investition als eine Ausgabe betrachten.
Eine weitere interessante Zahl: Die EU-Kommission schätzt, dass es in der Europäischen Union nur 44 systemisch wichtige Banken gibt. Es ist nicht sehr wahrscheinlich, dass sich von diesen 44 Banken die meisten in Deutschland befinden, eher sind es vier oder fünf. Der britische Premier [URL="http://www.ftd.de/personen/B/BrownGordon"]Gordon Brown[/URL] hat schließlich auch nicht das gesamte britische Finanzsystem gerettet, sondern zunächst eine kleine Auswahl von acht Kandidaten getroffen, die der Staat zu rekapitalisieren bereit ist. So eine Auswahl hätten wir auch treffen müssen - die Zahl wäre größer als null, aber viel kleiner als 2003.
Als am Sonntagabend das Paket verabschiedet wurde, war ich zunächst verwirrt. Ich hatte erwartet, dass es eine explizite Garantie für den Geldmarkt geben würde, schließlich ist der in der vergangenen Woche vollkommen implodiert. Die Geldmarktsätze, an denen viele Hypotheken- und Unternehmenskredite hängen, sind viel zu hoch. Der Grund, warum es jetzt keine explizite Geldmarktversicherung gibt, wie viele Ökonomen sie zuvor gefordert haben liegt darin, dass man den gesamten Bankensektor total versichert. Sie ist also implizit da.

hängte Grafik: blasen.jpg
[IMG]http://www.ariva.de/board/anonymize/attachment.m?aid=216527&resize_x=600[/IMG]

[B]Samstag, 14. Februar 2009[/B]

[B] "Quartalsgewinne im S&P 500 erstmals negativ" [/B]

Zum Jahresende 2008 erwirtschafteten die 500 größten US-Unternehmen, welche im US-Aktienindex S&P 500 gelistet sind und 75% des US-Aktienmarktes repräsentieren, dass sechste Quartal in Folge einen Gewinnrückgang. Die operativen Gewinne im 4. Quartal 2008 brachen um gewaltige -62% bzw. auf +5,77 Dollar je Aktie im Vergleich zum Vorjahresquartal ein (Q3 2008 mit -21,6%, Q2 -29,3%, Q1 -25,8%, Q4 2007 mit -30,8% und Q3 2007 mit -9,4%, jeweils zum Vorjahresquartal)! Quartalsrückgänge der operativen Gewinne von 6 Mal in Folge gab es zuletzt im Zeitraum vom 1. Quartal 1951 bis zum 2 Quartal 1952 in den USA.

Zum ersten Mal allerdings, wurde auf Basis der bereits von 390 Firmen veröffentlichten Geschäftsberichte, von der Ratingagentur Standard&Poors ein Verlust (Ergebnis nach Steuern) von -10,44 Dollar je Aktie für den gesamten Index ausgewiesen, nach +7,44 Dollar im Vorjahresquartal!

[IMG]http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_4bEaRUYaLZ4/SZaZm2nQYJI/AAAAAAAABsg/5FubHNCKCqg/s400/0+1+a+arb15.png[/IMG] > Die berichteten Gewinne nach Steuern je Aktie der im S&P 500 gelisteten Unternehmen. Rekordgewinne je Aktie fielen im noch im 2. Quartal 2007 mit +21,88 Dollar an, dann begann der steile Abstieg bis zum 4. Quartal 2008 mit einem Verlust von -10,44 Dollar je Aktie! Quelle Chart: [COLOR=#3333ff]Econompicdata.blogspot.com[/COLOR] < Die bisher von 390 Unternehmen aus den S&P 500 Index, welche 84,8% des Marktwertes des Index ausmachen, berichteten Verluste beliefen sich auf -90,8 Mrd. Dollar. Der Anteil der Verluste der Finanzinstitute, welche im Index gelistet sind, beläuft sich auf -70,4 Mrd. Dollar. Die Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors weisen einen Verlust von -20,4 Mrd. Dollar aus. Allerdings, zieht man den Rekordverlust in Q4 2008 des US-Ölkonzerns ConocoPhillips in Höhe von -31,76 Mrd. Dollar ab, ergeben sich doch noch Gewinne für die Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors. Diese zeigen ein zusätzliches Abwärtspotential der Verluste für das 1. Quartal 2009 an, denn die wirtschaftliche Lage hat sich weiter verschlechtert!
ConocoPhillips wies im 4. Quartal 2008 immense Goodwill Abschreibungen auf die Beteiligung am russischen Ölkonzern Lukoil mit -7,4 Mrd. Dollar und Abschreibungen auf Förderanlagen und Produktionsstätten in Höhe von -24,4 Mrd. Dollar aus. Gleichzeitig sank der Umsatz wegen dem dramatisch fallenden Ölpreis von 70,04 Mrd. Dollar im 3. Quartal auf nur noch 44,5 Mrd. Dollar in Q4!
Wie man es auch dreht und wendet, alle US-Wirtschaftsdaten, auch die Unternehmensgewinne sind ein Desaster! Auf die Bereinigung der sich über Jahrzehnte aufgeschaukelten unglaublichen Marktverwerfungen und Ungleichgewichte, versucht man mit Niedrigzinsen und Rekordliquiditätshilfen, Krediten zu antworten. Damit versucht man eine der Ursachen der Finanzkrise - zu billiges Geld - mit noch mehr billigem Geld auszutreiben. Ein höchstwahrscheinlich nicht nur auf längere Sicht erfolgloses Experiment! Die Sicherung von Arbeitsplätzen als Voraussetzung für Finanzhilfen, die strenge Regulierung des Bankensystems, wichtige Eingriffe und Korrekturen im Finanzsystem, die Eindämmung von Spekulation, die Ausrichtung unternehmerischen Handelns auf Nachhaltigkeit usw. sind bis jetzt weitestgehend unterblieben und ein gewichtiger Zeitraum ist ohne adäquates Handeln verstrichen!

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[B]Staatsanleihen: [/B] Anleger zweifeln an Kreditwürdigkeit der USA [IMG]http://www.welt.de/multimedia/archive/00754/glaeubiger_usa_DW_F_754112a.jpg[/IMG]

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[B]Sunday, February 15, 2009[/B]

[B] [URL="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/02/will-eastern-europe-trigger-financial.html"]Will Eastern Europe Trigger a Financial Meltdown?[/URL] [/B]

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We've commented from time to time that a possible financial flashpoint is countries that got themselves in the same fix as Iceland , of having a banking sector engaged in the generally risky practices that were standard form recently, and was outsized relative to the economy (Willem Buiter also points out that that precarious situation is made worse by having your own teeny currency).

While Ireland is in that position, a more immediate trigger for trouble is Eastern Europe. We've mentioned in particular the precarious position of Austria, which was a big lender to the region. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard remarks in the [URL="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/4623525/Failure-to-save-East-Europe-will-lead-to-worldwide-meltdown.html"]Telegraph[/URL]:
[INDENT]Austria's finance minister Josef Pröll made frantic efforts last week to put together a €150bn rescue for the ex-Soviet bloc. Well he might. His banks have lent €230bn to the region, equal to 70pc of Austria's GDP.

"A failure rate of 10pc would lead to the collapse of the Austrian financial sector," reported Der Standard in Vienna. Unfortunately, that is about to happen.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) says bad debts will top 10pc and may reach 20pc. The Vienna press said Bank Austria and its Italian owner Unicredit face a "monetary Stalingrad" in the East.

Mr Pröll tried to drum up support for his rescue package from EU finance ministers in Brussels last week. The idea was scotched by Germany's Peer Steinbrück. Not our problem, he said.....[/INDENT]
Yves here. Recall we said a few days ago (based on admittedly a small number of conversations, but the Austrian and German businessmen were knowledgeable) that the Austrian banks were widely known to be bankrupt, that Austrians knew they needed to be rescued and would need help. The Austrians were highly confident that Germany would fund a bailout, and the Germans were mystified that the Austrians were so certain. The Germans' doubts appear to have been well founded. Back to the piece:
[INDENT]Stephen Jen, currency chief at Morgan Stanley, said Eastern Europe has borrowed $1.7 trillion abroad, much on short-term maturities. It must repay – or roll over – $400bn this year, equal to a third of the region's GDP. Good luck. The credit window has slammed shut....

"This is the largest run on a currency in history," said Mr Jen.

In Poland, 60pc of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary, the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly – by lenders and borrowers – it matches America's sub-prime debacle. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not.

Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe, especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks. En plus, Europeans account for an astonishing 74pc of the entire $4.9 trillion portfolio of loans to emerging markets....

Whether it takes months, or just weeks, the world is going to discover that Europe's financial system is sunk, and that there is no EU Federal Reserve yet ready to act as a lender of last resort or to flood the markets with emergency stimulus....

Erik Berglof, EBRD's chief economist, told me the region may need €400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system....

The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, w...We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights.

Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country – facing a 12pc contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices – is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5pc in the fourth quarter...

"This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s," said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank.[/INDENT]
This is looking ugly indeed, and that's before you consider that European banks are on average much more leveraged than their US counterparts.

[url]http://www.mmnews.de/index.php/200902142256/MM-News/Rollover.html[/url]

Samstag, 14. Februar 2009 [FONT=verdana][B]Dollar-Kollaps, Bank Run, Zusammenbruch des Geldsystems, weltweite Unruhen. Ein Film zeichnet das Szenario des System-Untergangs. Doch der Finanzthriller "Rollover" stammt aus dem Jahr 1981. Der Inhalt aber erinnert an eine Realität, die uns bald einholen könnte. [/B][/FONT] [URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:48465.1020.A.jpg"][IMG]http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/c/c0/48465.1020.A.jpg/200px-48465.1020.A.jpg[/IMG][/URL][FONT=verdana]Hier ein Zusammenschnitt des Films, welcher zwischendurch Zweifel aufkommen lässt, ob das hier gezeichnete Szenario tatsächlich Fiktion oder Wirklichkeit ist. Der Film wurde mit Szenen eines Interviews mit dem republikanischen Abgeordneten Kanjorski "akutalisiert", welches vor einem Monat statt fand. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana]Dieser beschreibt, dass das System im Herbst letzten Jahres vor dem Kollaps stand, wenn die US-Regierung nicht eingegriffen hätte. Innerhalb von Stunden wurden über 500 Milliarden Dollar von den Konten abgezogen. Die Bewegung sei so stark gewesen, so Kanjorski, dass innerhalb von 24 Stunden Billionen verloren gingen und damit das Gesamtsystem kollabiert wäre.[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana][U]Das eingeschnittene C-SPAN Interview ist kein Fake[/U], es ist echt und wird daher in den USA stark diskutiert![/FONT]
[FONT=verdana]Gerade dieses Interview in Zusammenhang mit der Fitkion im Film ergibt eine gruselige Mischung, von der man nur hoffen kann, dass sie nicht Wirklichkeit wird. [/FONT]

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America's banking crisis
[B]Worse than Japan?[/B]

Feb 16th 2009 | WASHINGTON, DC
From [I]The Economist[/I] print edition
[B]Look carefully and the answer could be yes[/B]

Illustration by Claudio Munoz[IMG]http://media.economist.com/images/20090214/D0709FN2.jpg[/IMG]
THERE is one consolation for the depressing instability of finance. History offers a rich array of banking crises from which policymakers can draw lessons—and against which today’s rescue plans can be judged. According to an IMF database, there have been 124 “systemic” banking crises since 1970—episodes in which bad debts soared across the economy and much of the banking sector was insolvent.
Most of those were in the developing world. But the list also includes half a dozen rich-country crashes, from Japan’s slump after its property bubble burst in the late 1980s, to the Nordic bank crises in the early 1990s. All involved deep recessions, required massive government intervention to clean up bust banks, and led to big increases in public debt as economies shrank while government spending soared. But the speed of recovery differed dramatically; Japan endured a decade of economic stagnation, whereas South Korea returned to growth within two years of its 1997 banking disaster.
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Received wisdom holds that policy choices determined the pace of recovery. Sweden rebounded quickly because it acted fast: removing dud assets from banks’ balance-sheets, recapitalising weak banks and nationalising where necessary. Japan stalled for a decade because it took years to recognise the scale of its mess. In his first presidential news conference on February 9th, Barack Obama pointed to Japan as an example of what not to do. Its “lost decade”, he argued, was the consequence of “not act[ing] boldly or swiftly enough”.
There is truth to that analysis. Japan’s central bank took too long to fight deflation; its fiscal stimulus was cut off too quickly with an ill-judged tax increase in 1997; and it did not begin to clean up and recapitalise its banks until 1998, almost a decade after the bubble had burst. But the history of bank failures suggests that Japan’s slump was not only the result of policy errors. Its problems were deeper-rooted than those in countries that recovered more quickly. Today’s mess in America is as big as Japan’s—and in some ways harder to fix.
[B]Double bubble[/B]

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This crisis, like most others in rich countries, emerged from a property bubble and a credit boom. The scale of the bubble—a doubling of house prices in five years—was about as big in America’s ten largest cities as it was in Japan’s metropolises. But nationwide, house prices rose further in America and Britain than they did in Japan (see first chart). So did commercial-property prices. In absolute terms, the credit boom on top of the housing bubble was unparalleled. In America private-sector debt soared from $22 trillion in 2000 (or the equivalent of 222% of GDP) to $41 trillion (294% of GDP) in 2007 (see second chart).
Judged by standard measures of banking distress, such as the amount of non-performing loans, America’s troubles are probably worse than those in any developed-country crash bar Japan’s. According to the IMF, non-performing loans in Sweden reached 13% of GDP at the peak of the crisis. In Japan they hit 35% of GDP. A recent estimate by Goldman Sachs suggests that American banks held some $5.7 trillion-worth of loans in “troubled” categories, such as subprime mortgages and commercial property. That is equivalent to almost 40% of GDP.
As the world’s biggest debtor, America headed into this bust in a very different position from Japan, a creditor nation rich in domestic savings. Nonetheless the macroeconomic trends in America look more like those that existed in Japan than other crisis-hit countries. Most big banking failures, from Sweden’s to South Korea’s, were created or worsened by a currency crash. Tumbling exchange rates raised the real burden of foreign-currency loans, forced policymakers to keep interest rates high and pushed up the fiscal costs of bank rescues. (Because of the rupiah’s collapse, for instance, the clean up of Indonesia’s failed banks in 1998 cost more than 50% of GDP.) But, by boosting exports, a weaker currency also offered a route to recovery. In Japan, by contrast, the yen stayed strong as the economy slumped, deflation set in and the banking problems grew.
In some ways America’s macroeconomic environment is even trickier than Japan’s. America may have a big current-account deficit, but the dollar has strengthened in recent months. America’s reliance on foreign funding means the risk of a currency crash cannot be ruled out, however. That, in turn, places constraints on the pace at which policymakers can pile up public debt. And even if the dollar were to tumble, the global nature of the recession might mean it would yield few benefits.
That is a big change. The most concentrated recent episode of systemic banking crises was the Asian financial crash in the late 1990s. The regional downturn was dramatic as firms slashed investment and paid back debt. But buoyed by strong demand in the rest of the world, particularly America, these countries’ exports soared, allowing a quick recovery. Even Japan eventually built its economic recovery on the back of booming exports. Today demand is falling rapidly across the globe and most big developed economies face simultaneous banking crises. With demand weak everywhere, the familiar route to recovery is blocked.
[B]Beyond the banks[/B]

Administratively, today’s crisis is far more complex than it was in countries where the clean-ups are presently being praised. In Sweden’s highly concentrated banking system, one firm—Nordbanken—accounted for a quarter of all loans. The government dealt with a big part of the problem by taking over two banks. America’s finance industry is more diffuse. Even after a wave of government-induced consolidation, there are at least a dozen systemically important commercial banks.
More important, Sweden’s much-praised bad banks, into which the government shovelled troubled loans, dealt with straightforward credit backed by clear collateral. Even then the success was unusual. According to the IMF, asset-management companies were set up in 60% of banking crises, but were generally “ineffective”. That seems more likely today when the complexities of securitisation have left “toxic assets” that range from pools of car loans to fiendishly complex collateralised-debt obligations, which are much harder to unravel, value and manage.
What is worse, today’s bust is not just about banking. America faces twin financial crashes (as, to a lesser degree, do other Anglo-Saxon countries): one in the regulated banking sector and a simultaneous collapse of the “shadow banking system”, the universe of hedge funds and investment banks responsible for much of the recent securitisation boom as well as for the sharp rise in financial leverage.
As a result, standard measures of banking distress, such as the level of non-performing loans, understate the contractionary pressure. So far most of the credit collapse in America has come from the demise of securitisation. In 2007, for instance, $668 billion of non-traditional mortgages were securitised. Last year that figure dropped to $40 billion. Rapid deleveraging outside traditional banks also means that cleaning up banks’ balance-sheets may not break the spiral that is driving down asset prices and stalling financial markets. As the lower chart shows, financial-sector debt was the fastest-growing component of private-sector debt in recent years. Many of those excesses are being unwound at warp speed.
Illustration by Claudio Munoz[IMG]http://media.economist.com/images/20090214/D0709FN3.jpg[/IMG]
A final difference between today’s bust and most other big banking crises is the importance of household debt. Historically, serious banking busts have mainly involved overborrowing by firms. In Japan, for instance, corporate borrowing soared in the 1980s against the collateral of rising share and property prices.
Today, however, household profligacy, which underpins much of the other debt, has been the problem. After the dotcom bust, American firms held back. Virtually all the rise in non-financial debt since 2000 was among households, as Americans tapped into the rising equity in their homes. Although troubled business debts, such as commercial property, are rising, households are the worst hit.
That has important implications. Household balance-sheets are more difficult to restructure than corporate ones, which involve far fewer people. Politically, the process raises questions of fairness. How far, for instance, should taxpayers bail out reckless homeowners who bought mortgages they could not afford? On the other hand, the economic dislocation from unwinding a household-debt binge may be less disruptive than restructuring swathes of firms. As Anil Kashyap of the University of Chicago points out, one reason Japan was so loth to acknowledge the depths of its banking problems was the knowledge that a banking clean-up would require a large-scale restructuring of Japanese firms which, in turn, would throw many people out of work. Restructuring household debts may be political dynamite, but it would not require a wholesale remaking of corporate America.
Nonetheless, the rebuilding of American households’ balance-sheets is likely to force a reliance on government demand that is bigger and longer-lasting than many now imagine. In the aftermath of Japan’s bubble, firms spent more than a decade paying down debt and rebuilding their balance-sheets. This sharp rise in corporate saving was countered by a drop in the savings rate of Japanese households and, most importantly, by a huge—and persistent—increase in budget deficits.
A similar dynamic will surely play out in America’s over-indebted households. With their assets worth less and credit tight, people will be forced to save much more than they used to. The household saving rate has risen to 3.6% of disposable income after being negative in 2007. For much of the post-war period it was around 8%, and in the short-term it could easily exceed that. But, whereas dis-saving by Japanese households countered the corporate balance-sheet adjustment, American firms are unlikely to invest more while consumers are in a funk. Propping up demand may therefore require more persistent, and sustained, budget deficits than in Japan.
Add all this together and the ease with which American policymakers dismiss Japan’s experience is probably misplaced. Japan’s outcome—a decade in which growth averaged 1% a year and gross government debt rose by 80 percentage points of GDP—was not one to be proud of. But given the magnitude of today’s mess, it may soon seem not that bad after all.

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[B]Dolar yükseliyor kur riski büyüyor [/B]



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[B]Özel sektörün orta ve uzun vadeli dış borcu 139.7 milyar dolara ulaşırken, tamamına yakını bankalar ve şirketlere ait kısa vadeli dış borç stoku da 2008 sonu itibariyle 50.2 milyar dolar olarak açıklandı.[/B] [IMG]http://www.gazeteport.com.tr/stellent/fragments/gp_assets/images/resmibuyut.gif[/IMG]
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Toplam borcu 200 milyar dolara yaklaşan özel sektör, özellikle kısa vadeli borçlar dolayısıyla ciddi bir kur riski ile karşı karşıya bulunuyor.
Asıl kur riskinin yaşandığı kısa vadeli dış borç stoku, geçen yıl küresel krizin şiddetlendiği ve dış kaynak temininin zorlaştığı son çeyrekte 7 milyar dolara yakın küçülmesine karşın, 50.2 milyar dolarla yine yüksek boyutta bir kur riski oluşturuyor. Dış borçların büyük bölümü dolar üzerinden alınan kredilerden oluşuyor.

Geçen yıl özellikle Eylül’den bu yana kurlarda yaşanan hızlı yükseliş kısa vadeli dış borç nedeniyle yüklenilen kur riskini aşırı büyütürken, kriz nedeniyle dış kaynak girişinde ortaya çıkan sıkıntı borçların çevrilebilmesini zorlaştırdı.

Yurt dışında artan dolar talebinin de etkisiyle dolar kurunun son günlerde yeniden hızla yükselişe geçmesi kısa vadeli borçlarda kur riskini daha da büyütüyor.

Türkiye’de bankaların 24.4 milyar, diğer sektörlerin 24 milyar, Merkez Bankası’nın 1.9 milyar dolar kısa vadeli dış borcu bulunuyor. [B]50 MİLYAR DOLARLIK KISA VADELİ BORÇ
[/B]Türkiye’nin 2008 sonu itibariyle 50 milyar 218 milyon dolar olan kısa vadeli dış borç stokunun 24 milyar 405 milyon doları bankalar ait bulunuyor. Bunun da 9 milyar 148 milyon dolarını döviz kredileri, 6 milyar 732 milyon dolarını banka mevduatı, 5 milyar 363 milyon dolarını TL cinsinden mevduat, 3 milyar 162 milyon dolarını da döviz tevdiat hesapları oluşturuyor.

2008 sonu itibariyle Merkez Bankası’nın kısa vadeli dış borcu 1 milyar 856 milyon dolar olurken, diğer sektörlere ait kısa vadeli dış borç stoku da 23 milyar 957 milyon dolar düzeyinde bulunuyor. Bunun 21 milyar 971 milyon dolarla en büyük bölümü ticari kredilerden oluşuyor. Diğer krediler de 1 milyar 986 milyon dolar. [B]EYLÜL 2008’DE 57 MİLYAR DOLARI AŞMIŞTI
[/B]Toplam kısa vadeli dış borç stoku Eylül 2008 sonunda 57 milyar 186 milyon doları aşmıştı. Stok, Ekim-Aralık döneminde 6 milyar 968 milyon dolar azaldı.

Anılan dönemde bankalar kısa vadeli dış borcunu 2 milyar 631 milyon dolar, diğer sektörler ise 4 milyar 213 milyar dolar küçülttü. Bankalar dışındaki sektörlerin borcundaki azalmanın 4 milyar 67 milyon doları ticari kredilerde yaşandı.
Merkez Bankası da üç ayda borcu 124 milyon dolar azalttı.

Son üç aydaki 7 milyar dolara yakın azalmaya rağmen, 2008 yılının tümünde kısa vadeli dış borç stokundaki artış 8 milyar 531 milyon dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Söz konusu borç, 2007 sonu ile Eylül 2008 sonu arasındaki dönemde 15.5 milyar dolar artmıştı.

2008 yılının tümünde net olarak bankaların kısa vadeli borcu 7 milyar 585 milyon, diğer sektörlerin borcu 1 milyar 372 milyon dolar artarken, Merkez Bankası’nın borcu 426 milyon dolar azaldı. [B]AKP DÖNEMİNDE REKOR ARTIŞ
[/B]Küresel kriz koşullarında Türkiye’den sermaye kaçışı olasılığı ve dış kaynak teminindeki güçlük nedeniyle ciddi bir kur riski yarattığı için ekonominin “yumuşak karnı” haline gelen kısa vadeli borç stoku, AKP tek parti hükümetlerinin iş başında olduğu 2002 sonundan bu yana çok hızlı bir artış gösterdi. Bu dönemde en büyük artış da şirketler kesiminin borç yükünde gerçekleşti. Anılan dönemde uygulanan yüksek faiz-düşük kur politikası, cari açığı büyütürken, bankalar ve şirketler kesiminde dövizle borçlanarak, devlet iç borçlanma senetlerine yatırma eğilimini de güçlendirdi.

2002 sonunda 16 milyar 424 milyon dolar olan kısa vadeli dış borç, geçen yıl Eylül sonuna kadar olan dönemde yüzde 248 oranında 40 milyar 762 milyon dolar artış gösterdi. Bu artış da tamamen özel sektör borcundan kaynaklandı. 2008’in son çeyreğinde 6 milyar 968 milyon dolar azalan stokta, 2002-2008 dönemindeki net artış 33 milyar 794 milyon dolar oldu.
Türkiye'nin kısa vadeli dış borç stoku (Milyon dolar) [FONT=Consolas] Stok Değişim[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] ----------------------------- --------------------------------------[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] Eylül Aralık Ara.2002/ 2008 son Son Son[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] 2002 2007 2008 2008 Eyl.2008 Çeyrek 1 yıl 6 yıl[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] ----- ----- ----- ----- -------- -------- ------- --------[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas][B]MERKEZ BANKASI[/B] 1.655 2.282 1.980 1.856 325 -124 -426 201[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] MUHABİR AÇIKLARI 15 1 1 1 -14 0 0 -14[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] KREDİ MEKTUPLU DTH 1.640 2.281 1.979 1.855 339 -124 -426 215[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas][B]BANKALAR[/B] 6.344 16.820 27.036 24.405 20.692 -2.631 7.585 18.061[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] DÖVİZ KREDİLERİ 3.195 6.013 9.454 9.148 6.259 -306 3.135 5.953[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] DÖVİZ TEVDİAT HESABI 2.453 3.288 3.859 3.162 1.406 -697 -126 709[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] BANKA MEVDUATI 696 3.707 7.308 6.732 6.612 -576 3.025 6.036[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] TL CİNSİNDEN MEVDUAT 3.812 6.415 5.363 6.415 -1.052 1.551 5.363[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas][B]DİĞER SEKTÖRLER[/B] 8.425 22.585 28.170 23.957 19.745 -4.213 1.372 15.532[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] TİCARİ KREDİLER 7.144 21.084 26.038 21.971 18.894 -4.067 887 14.827[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] İTHALAT BORÇLARI 5.136 14.085 18.206 13.988 13.070 -4.218 -97 8.852[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] PREF.& PEŞİN İHRACAT 2.008 6.999 7.832 7.983 5.824 151 984 5.975[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] DİĞER KREDİLER 1.281 1.501 2.132 1.986 851 -146 485 705[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] KAMU 0 0 100 100 100 0 100 100[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] ÖZEL 1.281 1.501 2.032 1.886 751 -146 385 605[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas][B]TOPLAM 16.424 41.687 57.186 50.218 40.762 -6.968 8.531 33.794[/B][/FONT] [B]ÖZEL SEKTÖRÜN UZUN VADELİ BORCU 139.7 MİLYAR DOLAR
[/B]Bu arada özel sektörün yurt dışından sağladığı uzun vadeli kredi borçlarının bakiyesi 2008 yılında 18 milyar 805 milyon dolar artarak 139 milyar 722 milyon dolara ulaştı. Bunun da 40 milyar 704 milyon dolarının bankalar ve bankacılık dışı finansal kuruluşlara, 99 milyar 18 milyon dolarla en büyük bölümünün ise şirketler kesimine ait olduğu belirlendi. Geçen yıl bankalar uzun vadeli borç bakiyesini 1 milyar dolar dolayında azaltırken, şirketler kesiminin uzun vadeli borcu 19 milyar 807 milyon dolar arttı.

139.7 milyar dolarlık uzun vadeli borcun 133.2 milyar dolarla büyük bölümünün yabancı ticari bankalar, yerli bankaların yurt dışı şubeleri, diğer finansal kuruluşlar gibi “özel alacaklılar”a olduğu belirlendi.

Özel sektörün uzun vadeli yurt dışı kredileri 2002-2008 döneminde yaklaşık 4 kat artış gösterdi. Söz konusu borçlarda altı yıllık dönemde 110.6 milyar dolar artış yaşandı. Bu dönemde bankalar ve diğer finansal kuruluşların toplam uzun vadeli borcu 7.5 kat olmak üzere 35.9 milyar, şirketlerin borcu da 74.7 milyar dolarla 3 kat artış gösterdi.
Özel sektörün yurt dışından sağladığı uzun vadeli kredi borcu (Milyon dolar) [FONT=Consolas] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]Borçluya Göre Dağılım 29.143 30.066 36.757 50.310 81.750 120.917 139.722[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]-Finansal 4.791 5.285 8.536 15.876 28.320 41.706 40.704[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Bankalar 3.023 3.133 5.758 12.142 21.879 30.740 29.990[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Bankacılık Dışı Fin. Kur. 1.768 2.152 2.778 3.734 6.441 10.966 10.714[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]-Finansal Olmayan 24.352 24.781 28.221 34.434 53.430 79.211 99.018[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]Alacaklıya Göre Dağılım 29.143 30.066 36.757 50.310 81.750 120.917 139.722[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]-Resmi Alacaklılar 2.503 2.911 3.463 3.271 3.699 5.279 6.473[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]-Özel Alacaklılar 26.625 27.155 33.294 47.039 78.051 115.638 133.249[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Yabancı Ticari Bankalar 16.213 16.473 19.850 27.096 47.352 69.884 76.724[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Yerleşik Bank. Y.d.Şube ve İşt. 4.508 5.396 7.984 12.127 19.604 31.358 41.321[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Bankacılık Dışı Fin. Kur. 1.700 1.432 1.717 2.165 4.574 6.238 6.314[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas] .Finansal Olmayan 4.204 3.854 3.743 5.651 6.521 8.158 8.890[/FONT] [FONT=Consolas]-Tahvil Alacaklıları 15 0 0
[/FONT]

20 February 2009
Lars Rasmussen, Analyst, + 45 4512 8534, [email]laras@danskebank.dk[/email]
Turkey: Aggressive cut could spark lira weakness
The Turkish central bank (TCMB) cut its key policy rate (the borrowing rate) by a whopping 150bp to
11.50% and its less important lending rate by 150bp to 14.00%. The bank’s decision was more aggressive
than our expectation of a 100bp cut and the consensus expectation of a 50bp cut. The borrowing rate has
now been lowered by 525bp since November from 16.75% to 11.50%.
Even though aggressive rate cuts can be justified on macroeconomic grounds and lower inflation, we would
still argue that the TCMB could jeopardise the stability of the Turkish lira (TRY). With January inflation at
9.50%, the real interest rate is now only 2 percentage points. The TCMB said inflation is on the decline in
Turkey and it expected this to fall to below its target of 7.5% y/y by the end of 2009. Admittedly, inflation is
trending downwards, but weakening of the lira could easily reverse this trend and force the TCMB to deliver
emergency hikes. We have seen this before in 2006 and in 2008.
There are several factors that we think should have justified a less aggressive cut at the meeting yesterday.
Remember that government spending ahead of local elections is still quite buoyant and the progress in
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund on a new loan has been temporarily halted, until the
Turkish administration realises that its 2009 projections for growth and government spending should be
adjusted lower. We are optimistic that an agreement will be reached between Turkey and the IMF (USD20-
25bn), but it is unlikely to happen before the local elections on 29 March, since PM Erdogan will probably
not want to have his hands tied before the elections (IMF will demand a significant fiscal tightening).
Hence, we believe that the TCMB has now jeopardised the stability for the lira going forward. Furthermore,
there is a lot of concern about developments in the CEE markets, which have been tumbling in recent weeks,
on the back of fears over external imbalances. This sell-off has thus far not affected the Turkish financial
markets to a very large extent. However, there is a risk that it might do so in the coming weeks. Overall, we
recommend reducing exposure towards Turkish markets. The lira could weaken significantly and Turkish
rates have fallen aggressively in recent months, and are probably very close to a bottom.

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