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[COLOR=#000080]A Bubble Full of Hot Air[/COLOR]
By Tom Graff
Street.com Contributor
8/20/2010 5:15 PM EDT
The idea that there is a bubble in the bond market continues to persist. This week [COLOR=#0000FF]Jeremy Siegel and Jeremy Schwartz[/COLOR] tried to dredge up some negative analysis in The [I]Wall Street Journal[/I] to make the case. Of course, after a cursory consideration of their points, the whole argument fell apart...Th[COLOR=#000000]e Siegel/Schwartz op-ed in [I]The Wall Street Journal[/I] generated some bu[/COLOR]zz but provided little in the way of good analysis. [COLOR=#0000FF]The authors tried to call attention to similarities between the dot-com bubble and the current Treasury market[/COLOR] -- particularly with regard to the astoundingly high price-to-earnings ratios that characterized the dot-com bubble. But [COLOR=#CC0000]the comparisons to either the dot-com bubble, or the housing bubble, hold absolutely no water.[/COLOR]
First, consider the nature of a bubble. Bubbles form as investors develop irrational expectations for future returns and imagine getting rich by investing in the bubble asset. This was true of both the dot-com bubble and the housing bubble. Moreover, that demand is fueled by easy access to capital. In the 1990s, it was the tech-oriented venture funds that were throwing money at every internet-based business idea. The housing bubble was fueled by mortgage underwriters that eased their lending standards, thus allowing marginal buyers to enter the market.
[COLOR=#CC0000]No one thinks they are going to get rich by betting on Treasury bonds.[/COLOR] We all know yields are low and thus returns on bonds are likely to be commensurate. [COLOR=#0000FF]There is also no increase in leverage evident in the bond market. [/COLOR]In fact, both dealers and hedge funds have less leverage in bond-related trading today than they did three years ago.
Perhaps more damning to the bubble argument is the [COLOR=#0000FF]lack of new bond supply[/COLOR]. It's Economics 101: if price rises, supply should also rise. Again, this was perfectly evident during the dot-com era as companies with poorly conceived business models rushed to the red-hot IPO market. The same held true during the housing bubble. Homebuilders put structures on every available plot of land. Nothing like that is happening in the bond market. [COLOR=#0000FF]Neither corporations nor households are increasing borrowing rates. In fact, until very recently, corporations were piling up cash on their balance sheets.[/COLOR] [COLOR=#CC0000]If interest rates are fundamentally too low, why hoard cash?[/COLOR]
The most indefensible claim the authors make in the Journal piece is that 10-year TIPS are trading at a level "more than 100 times its projected payout." Basically they are saying that if you pay $100 for a bond with a 1% yield (which is the current stated yield on 10-year TIPS), then your cash flow is 100x the price you paid. They then try to equate this to a price-to-earnings multiple of 100x. This is a [COLOR=#0000FF]nonsensical statement.[/COLOR][I] [Bei den TIPS muss man den "eingebauten Inflationsschutz" in der Berechnung abziehen - A.L.][/I]
Second, there is absolutely no comparison between the price-to-earnings multiple of a stock's and a bond's cash flows. With a stock, you actually are acquiring a string of cash flows and your initial investment can be described as a multiple of your total expected cash flow. With a bond, all principal is repaid at maturity. So you aren't paying a multiple of your total cash flows up front with a bond. You are paying a multiple of your eventual principal payment. Right now the TIPS bond referenced by Siegel and Schwartz is at a 1.02x multiple. Big deal.
We can have an intelligent debate about whether or not bonds are over-valued. [COLOR=#0000FF]With the 10-year threatening the March 2009 lows of 2.53%, I think there is very little upside to bonds her[/COLOR][COLOR=#0000FF]e. But a bubble implies some large losses will occur when rates finally reverse. The fundamentals [I][= Deflation - A.L.][/I] just don't support this view.[/COLOR]
[B]Treasury Bonds: Risk[/B]
[COLOR=#CC0000]This week showed an obvious short-squeeze in the 30-year Treasury.[/COLOR] For eight trading days in a row, the 30-year (which, in bond parlance, is called the "long bond") outperformed the 10-year on a yield basis -- even on days when rates generally rose. This illustrates the trouble with the long bond: it has a mind of its own.
[COLOR=#0000FF]There are a lot of natural long-duration buy-and-hold buyers (insurance companies and pension funds are two examples)[/COLOR]. This tends to limit the float of long-term bonds. Outside of the current 30-year, there is very little volume in anything between 10 and 29 years. [COLOR=#0000FF]No one plays there other than the buy-and-hold players. [/COLOR]In addition, long bond futures have about one-third the volume and open interest that 10-year futures do. That's because bond futures are basically speculative vehicles while many use 10-year futures for hedging.
This is a long-winded way of saying that the long bond gets real technical real fast. That's why I've always believed that [COLOR=#0000FF]if you want to make a play on interest rates, you would be better served to do it in the 10-year sector than the long-bond sector. You are much less likely to get caught up in a short-squeeze.[/COLOR][I] [Yo, TBT war diese Woche "Opfer" dieses Shorts-Squeeze - A.L.][/I]
This is very relevant to those playing in the popular TLT and TBT ETFs. Both focus on the 20-year-and-longer part of the yield curve. [COLOR=#0000FF]You can very easily get caught up in the wild technicals of this part of the curve.[/COLOR] If you want to play Treasury bonds, consider ETFs that are oriented to seven-year to 10-year bonds such as iShares Barclays 7-10 Year Treasury (IEF) , [COLOR=#0000FF]UltraShort 7-10 Year Treasury ProShares (PST)[/COLOR] and ProShares Ultra 7-10 Year Treasury (UST) . You can get exposure to bonds without becoming a victim of these kinds of technical moves.
[B]Corporate Bonds: Clue[/B]
A funny thing happened on the way to a double-dip. Corporations actually started to spend their cash. Stock buy-back programs are increasing. On Thursday alone, we heard about significant buy-back programs from The Children's Place Retail Stores (PLCE) , Nordstrom (JWN) , Gap (GPS) , Marvell Tech (MRVL) , Rambus (RMBS) , and Intuit (INTU) .
There has also been a substantial increase in M&A activity. Some significant ones recently have included Dell (DELL) buying 3PAR (PAR) , Intel (INTC) buying McAfee (MFE) , and First Niagara Financial Group (FNFG) buying NewAlliance Bancshares (NAL) , not to mention BHP Billiton's (BHP) offer to buy Potash (POT) . In most cases, these transactions include cash that comes from the acquirers' balance sheets.
This is critical to the economic recovery. It is an early sign that corporations aren't willing to continue holding large amounts of cash with no return on that asset. Not only does it show some modicum of confidence in future growth, it also gets unproductive money out of corporate bank accounts and into the economy.
We are also seeing nascent signs of an increase in borrowing demand. Corporate bond issuance has picked up markedly in the last three weeks.[I][Warum leihen sich die Firmen noch mehr Geld, wenn sie so viel Cash auf ihren Konten haben? Für mich gibt es nur die Erklärung, dass sie sich die zurzeit rekordtiefen Zinsen sichern wollen... - A.L.] [/I]Plus the Fed's H.8 release showed that bank lending increased by $24 billion last week, the largest non-quarter-end increase all year. Both of these are very early signs and hardly enough to make a definitive statement about borrowing activity. But it stands to reason that if businesses are willing to spend their cash, they should also be a little more willing to borrow [I](nicht zwingend logisch, mMn. In der Vergangenheit kamen Aktienrückkäufe fast immer an Börsenhochs, das Timing der Firmen war meist sehr schlecht).[/I]
If this is a trend that keeps up, it will be more stimulative than anything the Fed could do by printing more money. Share buy-backs may not seem terribly economically productive, but [COLOR=#0000FF]there is $3 trillion in cash just sitting on corporate balance sheets[/COLOR]. It will do more good in the hands of shareholders than it will sitting idle in a checking account [I][wenn Firmen eigenes Geld in eigene Aktien stecken, ist das ein Nullsummenspiel, da kommt nichts in die Händer der "shareholder", außer geringfügigen Kursanstiegen, die aber meist nicht mal die Verwässungen aus den ausufernden Options-Programmen der CEOs - deren Haupteinnahmequelle - wettmachen... A.L.][/I]. Mergers often involve lay-offs, but if general economic activity picks up, then the jobs will come[I] [...and if not, it won't -A.L.][/I].
Economically, this is the most bullish sign I've seen in a long time.[I] [Bondfritzen sind oft Permabullen - A.L.] [/I]But for corporate bonds, it comes out as a negative for credit quality. There has been a lot of talk about corporate balance sheets being unusually strong for a post-recession period. But if companies start spending cash and/or increasing borrowing, balance-sheet quality will decline. Of course, if this trend is indeed as stimulative as I believe it will be, the negative of a weaker balance sheet could be off-set by more revenue.
The right way to play this is to rotate into corporations that are less likely to lever up but that are just as likely to benefit from some economic improvement. For example, we prefer financials over cash rich technology companies. [COLOR=#0000FF]Also high-yield should outperform investment-grade in this scenario[/COLOR], i.e., companies already levered and are more dependent on economic growth that companies that may use more leverage to create shareholder value. [I][High-Yield-Bonds halte ich eher für einen Ritt auf der Rasierklinge. Als im Herbst 2008 langlaufende US-Staatsanlehen in den Himmel schossen, stürzten selbst Firmenbonds mit Investmendgrade gnadenlos in den Keller. Die Long-Bond-Rallye kann man in dem Sinne als Warnsignal betrachten - A.L.][/I]
[B]Mortgage-backed and Agency Bonds: Scrabble[/B]
MBS spreads pushed wider this week. According to Barclays, the MBS option-adjusted spread hit its widest point in 10 months on Wednesday before rallying on Thursday. The move has been based primarily on the technicals of the Fed allowing its MBS position to run off, as the spread is now 30 basis points (bps) wider since the Fed announced its reinvestment plan last week.
This move on the technicals doesn't make much sense to me. [I][Könnte gut auf Risikoaversion zurückgehen, da der Housingmarkt sich nicht erholt. Stünde dann ebenfalls im Einklang mit der Treasuries-Rallye - A.L.] [/I]As I wrote last week, MBS roll-off only adds around $10 billion to $20 billion to MBS supply per month. The total MBS market is $9 trillion. Even if we take out the Fed's position, you are talking about $8 trillion or so in bonds out there. [COLOR=#0000FF]I remain heavily underweight in MBS[/COLOR] (and very defensive with what I do have), so I'm enjoying the back-up in spreads. Still, you have banks and other front-end buyers that are so desperate for yield. This very minor Fed technical won't be enough to sustain a backup in MBS spreads. It will probably take a back-up in rates that causes the average lives of MBS to extend and will eventually result in major underperformance for MBS.
[B]TIPS: Pay Poor Tax[/B]
The 10-year TIPS break-even keeps falling, but I keep thinking it is extremely cheap. Consider the simple math of it. The current 10-year break-even is 1.57%. That means it takes consumer-price-index (CPI) prints of 1.57% on average to make the TIPS yield and the nominal bond yield equal. The most recent year-over-year CPI print is 1.2%. Let's say we get CPI of 1.2% for the next five years. We'd only need to see a CPI print at 1.9% for the following five years to average 1.57% over the whole period. We could make an even more dire scenario. Say we get CPI of zero for three years. You'd still only need 2.24% CPI to make an average of 1.57%.